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## OFF

### Neolib

#### Movements against neoliberalism are growing in Latin America and spill over -- the plans reifies neoliberalism --- ethics require we de-link to preserve the environment and indigenous culture.

Harris 8 (Richard L Harris: Professor of Global Studies at California State University, Monterey Bay; Managing Editor of the Journal of Developing Societies (SAGE India); and Coordi­ nating Editor of Latin American Perspectives (SAGE USA). “Latin America’s Response to Neoliberalism and Globalization,” http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3506\_2.pdf)

The economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries is obstructed by the power relations and international structures that regulate the world capitalist system. The structures of this system provide a hierarchical political and economic exoskeleton that constrains all national efforts to pursue any significant degree of self-directed, inward-oriented, balanced and environmentally sustainable development. Indeed, the geopolitical power structures that preserve and support the world capitalist system have made it almost impossible for the governments of the core as well as the peripheral countries in this system to pursue a path of inward-oriented, equitable, democratically controlled and environmentally sustainable development (Amin 2001b:20). Since the 1980s, inter-American relations and the economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean states have been shaped by these geo­ political structures and the neoliberal strategic agenda put forward by the government of the United States of America (USA), the major transnational corporations and the three major international financial institutions (IFIs) that operate in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Harris and Nef, 2008). This later group of IFIs includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The policies of these IFIs based in Washington generally follow the dictates of the government of the USA due to the controlling influence that it exercises over these institutions. Their agenda for the Latin American and Caribbean region gives priority to promoting and protecting the interests of the major investors and transnational corporations that are largely based in the USA and operate in the region. It also serves to maintain and strengthen the geopolitical hegemony of the USA over the Western Hemisphere (Harris and Nef). But conditions are changing. Washington’s neoliberal agenda for controlling the capi­ talist development of the Western Hemisphere and maintaining US hegemony over the region is increasingly threatened by a progressive alternative agenda for the regio­ nal integration of the Latin American and Caribbean countries that has begun to gain widespread support in the region. This alternative agenda for the region calls for the autonomous economic development of the region free of the hegemonic control and influence of the USA and the IFIs based in Washington. Not only does this type of development pose a fundamental threat to the hegemony of the USA in the region, it threatens the dominance of transnational capital throughout the Americas. Moreover, it also poses a significant threat to the global expansion and integration of the world capitalist system in general and to the global hegemonic coalition led by the government and transnational corporations of the USA. Today, political and economic strategies are being developed for moving from the prevailing export-oriented neoliberal model of economic development to new in­ ward-oriented models of sustainable development, tailored to the diverse conditions, economic capacities, political structures, natural endowments and cultural values of the societies involved. Moreover, a growing number of international and regional civil society organizations have emerged in recent years to create such alternatives. What the forums, networks, programs, and activities of these various types of organizations reveal is that there is a growing international network of organizations and social movements committed to promoting new, more equitable forms of international cooperation and regulation that support inward-oriented and sustainable development as well as genuine democracy at the regional and national levels. At the same time, these organizations argue that the present global trading regime that has been erected under the WTO should and can be replaced by a new global trading system that replaces the present system of so-called free but in fact unfair trade, with a sys­ tem that ensures «fair trade» and promotes South-South economic exchange and coo­ peration. Most of the progressive alternatives advocated by these organizations and the new left-leaning governments that have been elected to office in the region give priority to aligning the external relations of the countries in the region to the internal needs of the majority of the population. That is to say, decisions about what to export and what to import should be aligned with the needs of the population rather than the interests of transnational capitalists and transnational corporations or the hegemonic interests of the USA. Some of these alternative strategies involve what Walden Bello (2002) has referred to as «deglobalization.» That is to say, they involve unlinking the economies of these peripheral capitalist societies from the advanced capitalist centers of the world economy, particularly in the USA. They also involve throwing off the constraints that have been imposed upon the economic policies and structures of the­ se countries by the IFIs (IMF, World Bank, and IDB), the WTO and the other agents and regulatory regimes that regulate the world capitalist system. In fact, there appears to be growing interest throughout Latin America in revivifying the Pan-American ideal of unification, currently perhaps best expressed in Hugo Chávez’ Bolivarian dream of turning South America into a regional economic hegemon (DeLong, 2005). The governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay have indicated they want to join the government of Venezuela in creating a regional union. It has been proposed that this coalescing continental confederation should shift the region’s extra-continental trade towards Europe, Asia and South Africa and away from North America. The prospect of this happening appears to have alarmed Washington more than the increasing number of electoral triumphs of leftist politicians in the region (Delong). There has also been considerable talk in the region about creating a single currency for the South American countries that would be modeled on and perhaps tied to the Euro rather than the US Dollar. This discussion is symptomatic of what appears to be an emerging desire to create an integrated economic and political community that is strikingly different from the type of hemispheric economic integration scheme being pursued by the Washington and its allies in the region (DeLong). Moreover, there is an increasing tendency in the region to find alternatives to trading with the USA. In particular, several Latin American nations (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile) have been strengthening their economic relations with Asia, particularly with China. But the widespread popular opposition to neoliberalism and so-called globalization, and the shift to the Left in the region’s politics, represent much more than a serious challenge to US hegemony, they also represent a serious threat to the existing pattern of capitalist development in the region. Central to Washington’s strategy for the hemisphere has been the imposition of a neoliberal model of capitalist development on the region which involves the increasing integration of the region’s economies into a hemispheric ‘free trade’ area or rather a trade bloc that is dominated by the USA. This project is itself an essential part of the strategy of the USA for the domination of the global economy by its transnational corporations. The restructuring of the economies of the region under the mantra of neoliberalism and the banner of globalization has been aimed at giving the USA-based transnational corporations and investors free reign within the region and a strong hemispheric base from which to dominate the world economy In opposition to the neoliberal, polyarchical and globalizing model of development that has been imposed by the government of the USA and its allies in the region, the growing movement for an alternative form of development that is both genuinely democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable appears to be gaining ground in various parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. This alternative model of development requires the reorganization and realignment of the existing economies in the region. It also requires the replacement of the existing political regimes, which serve the interests of the transnational bloc of social forces that are behind the integration of the region into the new global circuits of accumulation and production that the major trans­ national corporations and the IFIs have been constructing since the 1970s. In addition to fundamental economic changes, most of the existing pseudo-democratic political regimes in the region need to be thoroughly democratized so that they are responsive to and capable of serving the needs and interests of the majority of the people rather than the ruling polyarchies and the transnational corporations operating in the region. An essential requirement for realigning the region’s economies so that they produce people-centered and environmentally sustainable development is the integration of these economies into a regional economic and political union that has the resources, structures and the power to operate independently of the government of the USA and the transnational corporations based in the USA as well as in the European Union and Japan. If this type of regional integration takes place, it will enable the Latin American and Caribbean states to break free of the hegemonic influence of the USA, and reverse the denationalization (‘globalization’) of the Latin American and Caribbean economies. Instead of the corporate-driven hemispheric integration of the region under the hegemony of the USA, a new system of regional economic cooperation and both equitable as well as environmentally sustainable development is desperately needed to improve the lives of the vast majority of the people living in Latin America and the Caribbean. This type of regional, equitable and sustainable development can only be success­ fully carried out by truly democratically elected political leaders with broad-based popular support who are sincerely committed to achieving this alternative rather than the elitist neoliberal model. It probably will also require democratic socialist political institutions and structures of production and distribution. Regionalism has been the dream of the democratic left for some time. The European Union has its origins in the French socialist dream of ending Franco-German enmity through unifying Europe, and African regionalism was the vision of African socialists such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who saw regional integration as the only means to progress beyond tribalism and colonialism and create a united and democratic Africa (Faux, 2001:4). Viewed from the perspective of those who want to create a people-cen­ tered, democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable social order in the Ame­ ricas, the corporate-dominated process of capitalist pseudo-globalization taking place in the region and around the world urgently needs to be replaced by what Samir Amin has referred to as a new system of «pluricentric regulated globalization» (Amin, 2001a). This alternative form of globalization requires the development of regional economic and political unions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and elsewhere, which collaboratively promote people-centered, democratic and envi­ ronmentally sustainable forms of development on a regional basis. According to Amin, these regional unions of states are needed to collaborate as partners in collecti­ vely regulating the global restructuring of the world economy for the benefit of the vast majority of humanity rather than the transnational corporations and the northern centers of the world capitalist system in the USA, Europe and Japan. This type of regional-based regulative order is needed to regulate and redirect inter­ national economic, social, and political relations so that these relations serve the inte­ rests and needs of the vast majority of the world’s population. The present power structures and regulatory regime of the world capitalist system support the transna­ tional corporate-driven restructuring and denationalization of the economies of both the societies at the core and in the periphery of this system. The Latin American and Caribbean countries need to ‘de-link’ step-by-step from this exploitative and inequitable system. They need to redirect and restructure their eco­ nomies so that they serve the needs of the majority of their people while also protec­ ting their natural resources and ecosystems. The alternative policies of economic, poli­ tical and social development proposed and in some cases adopted by the new leftist leaders, the progressive civil society organizations and their supporters, combined with the project of regional integration associated with the new Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), are significant indications of unprecedented and pro­ found transformation unfolding in the Americas. A growing number of civil society organizations and social movements throughout the Americas are pressuring the governments of the region to follow what the pro­ gressive civil society networks such as the Alianza Social Continental/ Hemispheric Social Alliance (ASC/HSA) describes as a regional model of integration that supports the environmentally sustainable and democratic development of all the societies in the region (see ASC-HSA, 2006). The ASC/HSA also contends that the UNASUR pro­ ject and the Bolivarian dream of unification is threatened by the so-called free trade agreements that Washington has negotiated with Chile, Colombia, Peru, the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. As the ASC/HSA makes clear in its documents and public information campaigns, these agreements compromise the national sovereignty, obstruct the local production of medicines, threaten public health, facilitate the profit-driven privatization of water and vital services such as health and sanitation, and threaten the survival of indigenous cultures, biodiversity, food sovereignty, and local control over natural resources. The «Alternatives for the Americas» proposal developed by this inter-American network of progressive civil society organizations and social movements calls on all governments in the region to subordinate trade and investments to sustainability and environmental protection as well as social justice and local democratic control over economic and social development (ASC/HSA 2002:5). The growing number and political influence of these kinds of networks, organizations and movements provide unquestionable evidence of the emergence of the social for­ ces and political conditions that Panitch (1996:89) and others (Harris, 1995:301-302; Jo­ nas and McCaughan, 1994) predicted in the 1990s would arise in opposition to neoli­ beralism, corporate-dominated pseudo globalization and the extension and consolida­ tion of the hegemony of the USA. It now seems increasingly possible that these forces and the political mobilization that they have helped to create will transform the politi­ cal regimes in the region as well as the nature of inter-American relations, bring about the regional integration of the Latin American countries and free these countries from US hegemony and the form of ‘turbo-capitalism’ to which they have been subjected. At this point, we can only speak in general terms about the new model(s) of develop­ ment that will replace the neoliberal model of uneven and inequitable development that has pillaged most of the region.

#### Environment collapse causes extinction – tipping points are coming

**Foster et al., Oregon sociology professor, 2010**

(John, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth, pg 14-8, ldg)

It is common today to see this ecological rift simply in terms of climate change, which given the dangers it poses and the intractable problems for capitalism it presents has grabbed all the headlines. But recently scientists—in a project led by Johan Rockstrom at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, and including Crutzen and the leading U.S. climatologist, James Hansen—have developed an analysis of nine "planetary boundaries" that are crucial to maintaining an earth-system environment in which humanity can exist safely. Climate change is only one of these, and the others are ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, the nitrogen and the phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use, change in land use, biodiversity loss, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution. For the last two, atmospheric aerosol loading and chemical pollution, there are not yet adequate physical measures, but for the other seven processes clear boundaries have been designated. Three of the boundaries—those for climate change, ocean acidification, and stratospheric ozone depletion—can be regarded as tipping points, which at a certain level lead to vast qualitative changes in the earth system that would threaten to destabilize the planet, causing it to depart from the "boundaries for a healthy planet." The boundaries for the other four processes—the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, freshwater use, change in land use, and biodiversity loss—are better viewed as signifying the onset of irreversible environmental degradation. Three processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries: climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss. Each of these can therefore be seen, in our terminology, as constituting an extreme "rift" in the planetary system. Stratospheric ozone depletion was an emerging rift in the 1990s, but is now stabilizing, even subsiding. Ocean acidification, the phosphorus cycle, global freshwater use, and land system change are all rapidly emerging global rifts, though not yet extreme. Our knowledge of these rifts can be refined, and more plan-etary rifts may perhaps be discovered in the future. Nevertheless, the analysis of planetary boundaries and rifts, as they present themselves today, helps us understand the full scale of the ecological crisis now confronting humanity. The simple point is that the planet is being assaulted on many fronts as the result of human-generated changes in the global environment.4 In the planetary boundaries model developed by Rockstrom and his associates, each ecological process has a preindustrial value (that is, the level reached before the advent of industrial capitalism), a pro-posed boundary, and a current status. In the case of climate change the preindustrial value was 280 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere; its proposed boundary is 350 ppm (necessary if tipping points such as a catastrophic rise in sea level are to be avoided); and its current status is 390 ppm. Biodiversity loss is measured by the rate of extinction (number of species lost per million species per year). The preindustrial annual rate, referred to as the "natural" or "background" rate of species loss, was 0.1-1 per million; the proposed boundary is 10 per million; whereas the current rate is greater than 100 per million (100-1,000 times the preindustrial back-ground rate). With respect to the nitrogen cycle, the boundary is con-cerned with the amount of nitrogen removed from the atmosphere for human use in millions of tons per year. Before the rise of industrial capitalism (more specifically before the discovery of the Haber-Bosch process early in the twentieth century), the amount of nitrogen removed from the atmosphere was 0 tons. The proposed boundary, to avoid irreversible degradation of the earth system, is 35 million tons per year. The current status is 121 million tons per year. In each of these extreme rifts, the stability of the earth system as we know it is being endangered. We are at red alert status. If business as usual continues, the world is headed within the next few decades for major tipping points along with irreversible environmental degradation, threatening much of humanity. Biodiversity loss at current and projected rates could result in the loss of upward of a third of all living species this century. The pumping of more and more nitrogen into the biosphere is resulting in the creation of dead zones in lakes and ocean regions (a phenomenon also affected by phosphorus). Each one of these rifts by itself constitutes a global ecological crisis. These ruptures reveal that the limits of the earth system are not determined by the sheer physical scale of the economy but by the particular rifts in natural processes that are generated.5 The emerging rifts in the other ecological processes, which have not yet overshot their boundaries, are scarcely less threatening. For the phosphorus cycle (categorized as part of a single planetary boundary together with the nitrogen cycle), the preindustrial quantity flowing into the oceans per year was approximately 1 million tons; the proposed boundary is 11 million tons (based on the assumption that ocean anoxic events begin at ten times the background rate); and its current status is already 8.5 to 9.5 million tons. In regard to ocean acidification, the value refers to a global mean saturation state of arag-onite (a form of calcium carbonate) in surface seawater. A decline in the number indicates an increase in the acidity of the ocean. The preindustrial value was 3.44 (surface ocean aragonite saturation state); the proposed boundary—after which there would be a massive die-down of shell-forming organisms—is 2.75; and the current status is 2.90. In the case of freshwater use, the preindustrial annual consumption of freshwater in km3 (cubic kilometers) was 415; the estimated boundary is 4,000 km3 (marking a threshold beyond which the irreversible degradation and collapse of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems is likely); and the current rate of consumption is 2,600 km3. For change in land use, the parameters are set by the percentage of global ice-free land surface converted to cropland. In preindustrial times, this percentage was very low. The proposed boundary is 15 percent (after which there is the danger of triggering catastrophic effects on ecosystems), and the current status is 11.7 percent. In each of these emerging rifts, we are faced with an orange alert status, in which we are rapidly moving toward extreme conditions, whereby we will pass the planetary boundaries, undermining the earth system that supports the conditions of life. No measure for chemical pollution has yet been determined, but proposals include measuring the effects of persistent organic pollu-tants (otherwise known as POPs), plastics, endocrine disrupters, heavy metals, and nuclear waste on ecosystems and the earth system in general. Likewise, no measure has yet been determined for atmospheric aerosol loading (the overall particulate concentration in the atmosphere on a regional basis), which can disrupt monsoon systems, lead to health problems, and interact with climate change and freshwater boundaries. Stratospheric ozone depletion is the one previously emerging rift that was brought under control (as far as anthropogenic drivers were concerned) in the 1990s, reducing what was a rapidly growing threat to life on the planet due to an increase in ultraviolet radiation from the sun. The preindustrial value of ozone concentration was 290 (Dobson Units—the measurement of atmospheric ozone columnar density, where 1 Dobson Unit is defined as 0.01 millimeters thick under standard pressure and temperature); the proposed planetary boundary is a concentration of 276 (after which life on the planet would experience devastating losses); and the current status is 283. Between 60°S and 60°N latitude, the decline in stratospheric ozone concentrations has been halted. Nevertheless, it will take decades for the Antarctic ozone hole to disappear, and Arctic ozone loss will likely persist for decades. Life on the planet had a close call.6 The mapping out of planetary boundaries in this way gives us a better sense of the real threat to the earth system. Although in recent years the environmental threat has come to be seen by many as simply a question of climate change, protecting the planet requires that we attend to all of these planetary boundaries, and others not yet determined. The essential problem is the unavoidable fact that an expanding economic system is placing additional burdens on a fixed earth system to the point of planetary overload. It has been estimated that in the early 1960s humanity used half of the planet's biocapacity in a year. Today this has risen to an overshoot of 30 percent beyond the earth's regenerative capacity. Business-as-usual projections point to a state in which the ecological footprint of humanity will be equivalent to the regenerative capacity of two planets by the mid-2030s.7 Rockstrom and his associates concluded their article in Nature by stating: "The evidence so far suggests that, as along as the [planetary boundary] thresholds are not crossed, humanity has the freedom to pursue long-term social and economic development." Although this is undoubtedly true, what is obviously not addressed in this conclu-sion—but is clearly the point of their whole analysis—is that these thresholds have in some cases already been crossed and in other cases will soon be crossed with the continuation of business as usual. Moreover, this can be attributed in each and every case to a primary cause: the current pattern of global socioeconomic development, that is, the capitalist mode of production and its expansionary tendencies. The whole problem can be called "the global ecological rift," referring to the overall break in the human relation to nature arising from an alienated system of capital accumulation without end.'

#### Vote Neg to reject the Aff’s neoliberal economic engagement in favor of a commons-based approach. That solves and creates space to challenge neoliberalism

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2003**

(Massimo, “Reflections on alternatives, commons and communities”, Winter, <http://www.commoner.org.uk/deangelis06.pdf>, DOA: 7-2-12, ldg)

This movement has posed the question of a plurality of “alternatives” to the social processes and arrangements that produce the horrors of modern global capital. In order to take the many calls for and practices of alternatives seriously, we have to make them relevant to the real people at the fringe or outside the movement. In other words, we want to move from movement to society not so much by persuading people to “join” our movement, but through a language and a political practice that by tracing the connections between diverse practices attempts to dissolve the distinctions between inside and outside the movement, i.e., actually moves ‘from movement to society’. To make the possibility of a new world that contains many worlds an actuality, we have to be able to shape our own discourse in such a way as to echo the needs and aspirations coming from below. We have to give coherence to their plurality, without imposing a model or reiterating dead ideologies. We need a discourse that helps to articulate the many alternatives that spring out of the points of crises of neoliberal capital, which seriously threaten to dispossess people of their livelihood and impose on them new or more intensified commodified patterns of life. We need a discourse that builds on the plurality of the many concrete struggles and their methods and help us to articulate a vision – not a plan – of the whole. Then we can better evaluate what are the global implications of our local struggles, as well as the local implications of global struggles for the building of a world that contains many worlds. But most of all, we need a discourse that recognizes the power we have to shape alternatives, at every level in society, that sets out from the simple fact that, contrarily to common belief, alternatives do exist, are everywhere and plural. To clarify, I think that every social node, that is every individual or network of individuals is a bearer of alternatives. This is evident not only when struggles erupt in any of the waged or unwaged local and trans-local nodes of social production. We just need to look around in the relative normality of daily routines to see that every social node “knows” of different ways to do things within its life-world and sphere of action longs for a different space in which things can be done in different ways. Each social node expresses needs and aspirations that are the basis of alternatives. For example: the alternative to working 10 hours a day is working 6; the alternative to poverty is access to the means of existence; the alternative to indignity is dignity; the alternative to building that dam and uprooting communities is not building that dam and leaving communities where they are; the alternative to tomatoes going rotten while transported on the back of an old woman for 20 miles is not GM tomatoes that do not rot, but access to land near home, or a home, or a road and a truck. Since every social node is aware of a spectrum of alternatives, the problem is simply how to make these alternatives actual? What resources are needed? How to coordinate alternatives in such a way that they are not pitted against each other as is the case of the competitive markets’ understanding of alternatives? How to solve the many existing problems without relying on the alienating coordinating mechanism of the market and creating instead social relations of mutual enrichment, dignity, and respect? These are I believe the bottom line questions on which a new political discourse must be based. Once we acknowledge the existence of the galaxy of alternatives as they emerge from concrete needs and aspirations, we can ground today’s new political discourse in the thinking and practice of the actualization and the coordination of alternatives, so as each social node and each individual within it has the power to decide and take control over their lives. It is this actualization and this coordination that rescues existing alternatives from the cloud of their invisibility, because alternatives, as with any human product, are social products, and they need to be recognized and validated socially. Our political projects must push their way through beyond the existing forms of coordination, beyond the visible fist of the state, beyond the invisible hand of competitive markets, and beyond the hard realities of their interconnections that express themselves in today forms of neoliberal governance, promoting cooperation through competition and community through disempowerment. As I will argue, this new political discourse is based on the project of defending and extending the space of commons, at the same time building and strengthening communities through the social fields.

### T G2G

#### *Interpretation* – federal economic engagement is only *direct aid* and *trade agreements* – they’re *third-party* engagement

Daga 13 (Sergio Daga, director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, Bolivia, visiting senior policy analyst, Heritage Foundation, M.A. Economics, University of Chile, B.A. Economics, Catholic University of Bolivia, also trained at Libertad y Desarrollo, Chile, and the Atlas Economic Research Foundation, United States, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela,” National Center for Policy Analysis, Debate Backgrounder No. 7, 5-15-2013, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message\_to\_Debaters\_6-7-13.pdf)

Economics is the branch of human knowledge concerned with the ¶ satisfaction of human wants through the production of goods and ¶ services, and the exchange of those goods and services between two ¶ or more individuals. Thus, economics encompasses human activities ¶ from simple barter between two individuals to international trade ¶ between firms or governments. Many of these economic activities ¶ are regulated by government, and some are outlawed. Trade and ¶ other economic activities that cross national borders — such as ¶ sales of goods and services, travel, migration or transfers of money ¶ — are regulated by both the government of the originating country ¶ and the government of the destination country. The government ¶ itself could be an economic actor, buying and selling from other ¶ governments or firms in other countries; or the government could ¶ regulate the private economic activities of individuals and firms.¶ Economic engagement between or among countries can take ¶ many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements ¶ designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign ¶ aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic ¶ engagement with private economic engagement through 3) ¶ international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) ¶ remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are ¶ important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate ¶ resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by ¶ the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with ¶ respect to some countries than to others.

#### *Prefer it* –

#### First, *limits* – any regulation, product, or private action is justified – infinite unpredictable AFFs

#### Second, *ground* – means-focus is key to stable disad and counterplan prep – they create a race to shallow, unpredictable single-sector strategies

### XO CP

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order to substantially ease United States economic restrictions with the Republic of Cuba.

#### An executive order can remove embargo provisions

ASCE 09 (Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, “Lifting the Cuban Embargo: The New Labors of Hercules?”, Cuba in Transition, 2009, <http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume19/pdfs/traviesodiaz.pdf>)

The actions taken by the United States in the past to remove trade embargoes against foreign countries appear to show that, unless such lifting is specifically limited by the legislation, Presidential decisions and determinations are sufficient authority to lift trade embargoes. On that basis, removing the TWEA as a source of the Cuban trade embargo would be straightforward. The simplest procedure would be for the President to abstain from issuing the required annual Determination that exercise of the TWEA authority with respect to Cuba is in the national interest of the United States. An alternative, but perhaps more controversial, course of action would be for the President to issue an executive order expressly ending the state of emergency with regard to Cuba. The same document could repeal other elements of the embargo, such as some of the CACR issued after March 1996. Alternatively, the Treasury Department could take administrative action to rescind the post-1996 CACR.64 In the case of the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 620(a)(1) of the FAA, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1), authorizes the President to “establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.” This section is clearly permissive and leaves the President free to determine whether to “maintain” the embargo, and consequently whether to lift it. The President could remove the embargo, to the extent it is imposed under this provision, by an executive order that rescinds President Kennedy’s Proclamation and revokes all subsequent executive orders and regulations thereunder implementing aspects of the embargo. The President could also take this action unilaterally, without reference to any external events.

#### Obama cred is *low* because of failure to make *unilateral* engagement decisions

Luxner 13 (Larry Luxner, citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Senior Advisor to President Barack Obama on matters of National Security and Foreign Policy, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Senior Research Professor of International Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Counselor, Trustee and Co-Chair of the Advisory Board, Center for Strategic and International Studies, member of the International Advisory Board, Atlantic Council, “Brzezinski: Obama Must ‘Regain’ Lost Ground in Foreign Policy,” Washington Diplomat, 1-31-2013, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=8841&Itemid=414)

Two days after the election that returned President Barack Obama to the White House for a second term, one of America's best-known former diplomats offered his take on the world — and the audience found his observations just as relevant as they were three decades ago.¶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981, didn't mince words when it came to Obama. "He has to undo the excessive reliance on speeches as he acts on the world scene — that is to say, the apparent assumption that a powerful speech on this or that subject is the same as effecting change," Brzezinski said. "The speeches all promised a great deal, but a great deal did not transpire. There was some marginal progress here and there, but by and large, his speeches remain speeches."¶ The Polish-American diplomat, 84, gave his own speech Nov. 8 at the Aspen Institute's Ambassadors' Security Roundtable luncheon at the Four Seasons hotel; moderating the discussion was CNN's Washington-based foreign affairs correspondent Jill Dougherty. In attendance were some 75 guests, including ambassadors representing a range of countries from Afghanistan to Zambia, as well as lobbyists, consultants and various State Department officials.¶ The event was part of the recent launch of the Ambassadors' Security Roundtable, a quarterly convening of ambassadors from around the world to promote greater international cooperation in the critical realm of security. The luncheon followed an off-the-record gathering of European envoys at the Aspen Institute's Wye River campus on Maryland's Eastern Shore in October.¶ Brzezinski, whom Dougherty introduced as a "living legend," said that in 2008, "at a lunch of this sort," he spoke of how impressed he was with the president-elect's "knowledge and understanding of the basic dynamics of this era."¶ Four years later, Brzezinski argued that Obama must reassert his credibility on the world stage through serious commitment and decisive action that will shape both his legacy and the country's trajectory.¶ "The management of our foreign policy and the protection of our national security are interwoven, and the president has no peer," Brzezinski said. "Congress is not a partner in the shaping of foreign policy. That is the special domain of the president, and he has to regain that territory."¶ It's territory Brzezinski has traversed for decades. During his time as Carter's national security advisor, Brzezinski oversaw the normalization of U.S. relations with China, the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the rise of mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan, the growth of dissent in Soviet-influenced Eastern Europe, the signing of a treaty to relinquish U.S. control over the Panama Canal, and the brokering of the Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel.¶ The chairman of countless commissions, task forces and councils, Brzezinski has been in the foreign policy trenches since the 1960s. The elder statesman remains active today, teaching at universities such as Harvard, Columbia and Johns Hopkins and writing numerous widely regarded books, including his most recent: "Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power."¶ In the 2012 book, Brzezinski argues that U.S. policymakers need to rethink the country's place in an interdependent world where America is no longer the sole superpower — adapting to shifting geopolitics while reasserting American influence in order to preserve global stability.¶ "Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism. Such an America could cause the geopolitical prospects of an evolving world — in which the center of gravity is shifting from West to East — to become increasingly grave," he writes. "The world needs an America that is economically vital, socially appealing, responsibly powerful, strategically deliberate, internationally respected, and historically enlightened in its global engagement with the new East."

#### *Turns the case* – means US influence *backfires* – and triggers *economic instability* AND multiple scenarios for *global conflict*

SCMP 2K (South China Morning Post, “Position of Weakness” December 11, 2000, Lexis Nexis)

A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the person who rules the United States influences events far beyond the shores of his own country. Both the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The first impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and growth across the world. A weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world. The Middle East, the conflict between India and Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by the authority the next US president brings to his job. There are those who would welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they would benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the Western alliance, there are those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel that a less assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers of having a weak, insecure US presidency outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be wished away. A president with a shaky mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will be constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about how to use his authority. This brings with it the risks of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens conflict. There are very few conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world needs the United States to use its power deftly and decisively.

### PTX

#### Immigration reform is top of the docket and passage is likely but uncertain – Obama must avoid perception of over-reach

Matthews 10-16 (Laura Matthews, U.S. politics writer for International Business Times, “2013 Immigration Reform Bill: 'I'm Going To Push To Call A Vote,' Says Obama,” 10/16/2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/2013-immigration-reform-bill-im-going-push-call-vote-says-obama-1429220)

When Congress finally passes a bipartisan bill that kicks the fiscal battles over to early next year, the spotlight could return to comprehensive immigration reform before 2013 ends.¶ At least that’s the hope of President Barack Obama and his fellow Chicagoan Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., chairman of the Immigration Task Force of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and one of the most vocal advocates for immigration reform in the House of Representatives.¶ “When we emerge from this crazy partisan eruption from the Republicans, there will be a huge incentive for sensible Republicans who want to repair some of the damage they have done to themselves,” Gutierrez said in a statement. “Immigration reform remains the one issue popular with both Democratic and Republican voters on which the two parties can work together to deliver real, substantive solutions in the Congress this year.”¶ Reforming the status quo has consistently been favored by a majority of Americans. Earlier this year, at least two-thirds of Americans supported several major steps to make the system work better, according to a Gallup poll. Those steps include implementing an E-verify system for employers to check electronically the immigration status of would-be employees (85 percent), a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, (72 percent), an entry-exit check system to make sure people who enter the country then leave it (71 percent), more high-skilled visas (71 percent) and increased border security (68 percent). The Senate passed its version of a 2013 immigration reform bill in June that includes, but is not limited to, a pathway to citizenship for immigrants without documentation and doubling security on the southern border. But that measure has stalled in the House, where Republicans are adamant they will take a piecemeal approach.¶ The momentum that lawmakers showed for reform has been sapped by the stalemate that that has shut down the government for 16 days and brought the U.S. to the brink of default. The Senate has agreed on Wednesday to a bipartisan solution to break the gridlock.¶ When the shutdown and default threat is resolved (for a time), that’s when Obama will renew his push to get Congress to move on immigration reform. On Tuesday the president said reform will become his top priority.¶ “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform,” Obama told Univision affiliate KMEX-TV in Los Angeles. “And if I have to join with other advocates and continue to speak out on that, and keep pushing, I’m going to do so because I think it’s really important for the country. And now is the time to do it.”¶ The president pointed the finger at House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, for not allowing the bill to be brought to the floor for a vote. Boehner had promised that the Senate’s bill would not be voted on unless a majority of the majority in the House supports it -- the same principle he was holding out for on the government shutdown before he gave in.¶ “We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,” Obama said. “The only thing right now that’s holding it back is, again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives. So we’re going to have to get through this crisis that was unnecessary, that was created because of the obsession of a small faction of the Republican Party on the Affordable Care Act.”¶ Republicans are opposing the Democratic view of immigration reform because of its inclusion of a 13-year path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. They said this amounted to “amnesty.” Some Republicans prefer to give them legal resident status instead.¶ Immigration advocates have also been urging Obama to use his executive authority to halt the more than 1,000 deportations taking place daily. Like the activists, Gutierrez said the government shutdown didn’t do anything to slow the number of daily deportations.¶ Some Republicans who welcomed Sen. Ted Cruz’s filibuster over Obamacare because it shifted the focus from immigration.¶ “If Ted [didn’t] spin the filibuster, if we don’t make this the focus, we had already heard what was coming,” Rep. Louie Gohmert, R-Texas, told Fox News on Tuesday. “As soon as we got beyond this summer, we were going to have an amnesty bill come to the floor. That’s what we would have been talking about. And that’s where the pivot would have been if we had not focused America on Obamacare.”¶ Still, pro-immigration advocates are hopeful they can attain their goal soon. “With more prodding from the president and the American people,” Gutierrez said, “we can get immigration reform legislation passed in the House and signed into law.”

#### Narrowing the agenda and focusing PC on immigration is key

Pickler 10-17 (Nedra Pickler, Associated Press, “Obama: Focus on budget, immigration, farm bill,” 10-17-2013, http://portal.truvista.net/news/read/category/political/article/ap-obama\_focus\_on\_budget\_immigration\_farm\_b-ap)

The government shutdown behind him, President Barack Obama focused Thursday on a new, trimmed down agenda by challenging Congress to overcome bitter partisan division and pass a budget and a farm bill and overhaul immigration.¶ The president said getting through those three priorities would help Washington move beyond "the cloud of crisis" created by the 16-day partial shuttering of government operations. But he acknowledged the political reality that even passing such a slimmed-down agenda by the end of the year will be tough.¶ "To all my friends in Congress, understand that how business is done in this town has to change because we've all got a lot of work to do on behalf of the American people, and that includes the hard work of regaining their trust," Obama said from the White House, the morning after signing a painfully forged bipartisan deal to reopen the government and avert a default.¶ Obama has slashed his wish list from earlier this year, when he called for legislation to address climate change, an increase in the minimum wage, gun control and the closure of the Guantanamo Bay prison. The reduced priorities underscore how difficult it has been to get legislation through Congress, the short legislative calendar left this year and Obama's limited political capital.¶ Prospects for passage of an immigration bill appear particularly dim. A bill passed by the Democratic-controlled Senate and backed by the White House includes billions for border security and a path to citizenship for those already living in the U.S. illegally, but most House Republicans have rejected the approach.

#### Plan drains capital – empirics

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Failure confirms global fears of political dysfunction – collapses U.S. influence and turns their perception advantages

Hammond 10-17 (Andrew Hammond, Prospect Magazine, “Debt debacle sends global shockwaves,” 10-17-2013, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/prospector/debt-debacle-sends-global-shockwaves/#.UmDegDfD\_ZY)

At the eleventh hour, Congress has agreed a short-term deal to raise the US debt ceiling. Although a worst-case scenario of debt default has therefore been dodged for at least a few more months, the troubling episode has nonetheless sent seismic shockwaves across the globe.¶ For some time, world leaders and senior US officials have warned that the impact of recent Washington political infighting has undermined the country’s reputation as a responsible international power, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. As Secretary of State John Kerry has asserted, this episode has sent a message “of political silliness” that we “can’t get our own act together;” we need to “get back on a track the world will respect.”¶ Worrying, political gridlock in Washington may only intensify in the build-up to next year’s congressional elections. This threatens key domestic reforms on the horizon, including an immigration overhaul, which is of interest to many internationally.¶ The perception, in many foreign capitals, is that growing partisanship and polarisation is also infecting US foreign policy. And, this is feeding angst over the reliability of Washington as an international partner, has been vocalised recently by countries, including China, Japan and Mexico.¶ Already this month, Obama has lost the opportunity to advance the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal as a result of the cancellation of his trip to Asia. Meanwhile, US trade officials were forced to cancel second round negotiations with Brussels over the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.¶ The gravity of this reputational issue for foreign affairs was recently acknowledged by two former defence secretaries. Republican Donald Rumsfeld asserted that “lack of leadership is sending a signal around the world that the United States is in decline, that that we’re withdrawing, that we as a country are not going to behave in a rational manner”. Meanwhile, Democrat Leon Panetta bemoaned that by “governing by crisis after crisis after crisis…the world will view the United States as less able to back its word with power”.¶ The spectacle of what is perceived, internationally, as Washington’s growing political dysfunction is as bemusing as it is alarming. And, according to some data, this is a driver behind a decline in the country’s international reputation.¶ For instance, the 2012-2013 FutureBrand Country Index shows a continued fall in the international ranking of the United States compared to other states. Based on a sample of around 3,600 people in 18 countries, it concludes that the country is “in decline”, partly because of “successive fiscal crises.”¶ This builds on earlier studies by the organisation, including in 2011-12 which highlighted “intensified speculation about America’s long-term stability”, partly as a result of the downgrade by Standard & Poor’s of the country’s credit rating. This was prompted by the last near debt default of Washington in 2011.¶ These findings on the US’s reputation are echoed by the 2013 BBC Country Rating Survey, which interviewed around 26,000 people in 25 countries, and also the 2013 Pew Global Study based on a sample of about 37,600 in 39 countries. The BBC poll recorded a fall in positive views towards the United States for a second consecutive year, while the Pew survey found that pro-US sentiment is slipping, after a strong bounce following Obama’s election in 2008.¶ To be sure, the scale of reputational damage is not — yet — as serious as that which faced the country during the previous Bush administration. For much of that period, surveys indicated profound international concern with US foreign and military policies. Indeed, the country’s reputation fell to its lowest level since at least the Vietnam War.¶ Then, as now, however, the country retains attractive qualities for many foreigners, including its popular culture and economic innovation. And the fact remains that, in times of major urgency, Washington can sometimes transcend partisan divisions and work in the national interest.¶ This was demonstrated, for instance, during the 2008-9 financial crisis when Congress and the administration acted more swiftly and comprehensively than many other countries to counteract the worst economic turmoil since at least the 1930s. This has been key in enabling the country to recover more quickly from recession than some other areas of the world.¶ While current problems should therefore be put into context, the situation is nonetheless troubling. And this is not the first time this year that a Washington political impasse has threatened negative economic repercussions.¶ Only very close to the wire did Congress in January agree a deal to prevent the United States falling off the “fiscal cliff”. It is estimated that the automatic tax increases and spending cuts might well have taken the US economy back into recession.¶ At the core of the current troubles is not just growing polarisation between Democrats and Republicans, but significant intra-party divisions too. This is especially so between moderate and right-wing Republicans (and the Tea Party faction).¶ Thus, although House Speaker John Boehner, the Republican leader in the House of Representatives, had pledged that Washington would not default, his views were not shared by more conservative colleagues.¶ While the full impact of this latest debacle remains unclear, one sure thing is that it has genuinely shocked and alarmed many across the world. This will not just further undermine the US’s reputation as a responsible international power, but could potentially send it into freefall again.

#### Independently triggers global economic collapse

Williams 10-13 (Carol J. Williams, Los Angeles Times, “Political gridlock over U.S. debt not just America's problem,” 10-16-2013, http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-us-debt-default-global-consequences-20131016,0,5619804.story)

World financial leaders have been warning for weeks that the U.S. congressional gridlock over funding the government and raising the debt ceiling are imperiling economies worldwide and undermining confidence in the U.S. dollar.¶ Even the news Wednesday that the partisan battle was about to be suspended until early next year has done little to spare U.S. leaders damage to their reputation as responsible stewards of the No. 1 global economy, analysts warned.¶ China and Japan are the largest foreign holders of U.S. Treasury bills, with $1.3 trillion and $1.1 trillion, respectively, of Washington's outstanding debt, according to International Monetary Fund data. That makes them the most exposed in the event -- once considered unimaginable but nowadays less so -- that the U.S. Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling by Thursday, when U.S. obligations are expected to exceed the current $16.7-trillion limit.¶ But with U.S. dollar securities accounting for 62% of all foreign currency reserves in central banks around the world, the recurring threat of default is driving international investors to eye alternative currencies as safer financial havens.¶ Global markets have been relatively calm in the midst of the political standoff in Washington as investment managers have been "assigning a small probability" of default, writes Amadou Sy, the Brookings Institution's senior fellow for global economy and development. ¶ "But this is a very dangerous game as it has repercussions both within and outside the U.S.," Sy said, citing an erosion of confidence in Washington fiscal management and the stability of the dollar.¶ Even flirting with the idea of leaving the U.S. government with no means to borrow threatens an escalating global crisis, the Treasury Department warned this month. ¶ "Credit markets could freeze, the value of the dollar could plummet, and U.S. interest rates could skyrocket, potentially resulting in a financial crisis and recession that could echo the events of 2008 or worse," the department said in its Report on Macroeconomic Effect of Debt Ceiling Brinkmanship.¶ A similarly bruising battle in Congress over the debt ceiling two years ago led credit-rating agency Standard & Poor's to downgrade the U.S. government's AAA rating. The other two major U.S. credit-rating institutions, Moody's and Fitch, retained the government's outstanding rating, but later that year they revised their outlook to negative. On Tuesday, Fitch announced that it was considering a downgrade.¶ "The announcement reflects the urgency with which Congress should act to remove the threat of default hanging over the economy," China's official New China News Agency reported, quoting a Treasury spokesperson, on an issue that is of vital interest in Beijing because of China's exposure.¶ U.S. lawmakers' bitter standoff over funding the federal government and raising the amount the country can borrow was the subject of deep concern at last weekend's annual meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Washington. IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde warned of "massive disruption the world over" should the U.S. fail to extend its borrowing authority and put the country's creditworthiness in doubt.¶ Lagarde, in an address to Fortune magazine's Most Powerful Women Summit in Washington on Tuesday night, blasted the "stopgap" approach U.S. lawmakers have taken to resolving fundamental economic policy disputes with short-term delays and then "back to the drawing board once again."¶ That, the IMF chief said, would simply "reactivate the same sort of trepidation and anxiety and worry" that have followed the recurring bouts of debate and procrastination.¶ British economist Neil Mackinnon similarly criticized the "ongoing fiscal dysfunction" gripping Washington. Political discord and uncertainty over whether the U.S. government can pay its debts "undermines global confidence in the U.S. economy" and inflicts damage to the economies of other countries holding U.S. securities, Mackinnon told Russia Today in an interview carried Wednesday.

#### Causes nuclear wars and turns multilat institutions and global democracy

Merlini 11 (Cesare, nonresident senior fellow, Center on the United States and Europe, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, “A Post-Secular World?” Survival, 53(2), 2011, ebsco, ldg)

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional **conflict** between states, perhaps even **involving the use of nuclear weapons.** The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism**.**

## Case

### 1NC Ag

#### US is modeling now

Viljoen and Bohn 12 (André , an architect and principal lecturer in architecture at the University of Brighton, and Katrin, an architect and joined the faculty in September 2001 where she teaches architecture at the University of Brighton“Scarcity and Abundance: Urban Agriculture in Cuba and the US”, 7 JUL 2012, Wiley)

Ten years on from our ﬁrst observations in Cuba, the country’s organopónicos remain, and elsewhere, not least in the US, urban agriculture experiments are testing out different scenarios. Baltimore, Milwaukee and Chicago are among a vanguard of North American cities actively encouraging urban agriculture. Recent discussions with planners and activists in the US conﬁrm the observation that practice is outstripping policy, as individuals take forward urban agriculture projects at a range of scales and with diverse aims. At the time of writing, one could say (if we grossly simplify the situation) that in Europe wider urban strategies, broadly in line with the CPUL city concept, are being developed, while in the US a complete spectrum of pioneering individual projects are underway aiming to encompass and interlock desires for social gain, empowerment, community building, environmental improvement and commercial viability. The range of new projects is staggering, and if Cuba’s urban agriculture revealed spatial possibilities and the effectiveness of systematic support systems, the US is testing different spatial, technical and ﬁ nancial models of production. In New York, for example, alongside a long-established radical and thriving community garden movement, new rooftop farms are appearing. Predominantly established by media-savvy young graduates and activists, these are pioneering projects whose participants – through sheer hard work – are prototyping new, commercially viable food-producing or educational enterprises. Across the US, hydroponics and soil-based cultivation are being utilised for rooftop and covered (glasshouse) cultivation with much work occurring in Milwaukee, led by Will Allen’s organisation Growing Power. Many new organisations, like Sweetwater Organics, prototyping large-scale urban aquaponic systems, can be traced back to Growing Power.

#### Lifting sanctions means agribusiness has a free hand to destroy Cuba’s ag model – maintaining sanctions are key

Gonzalez, 4 **-** Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law (Carmen, “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development” 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 419, lexis)

The greatest challenge to Cuba's unique agricultural experiment is the eventual renewal of trade relations with the United States and the re-integration of Cuba into the global trading system. At the behest of the United States, Cuba was excluded from major trade and financial institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, and regional trade organizations. n357 Paradoxically, while Cuba's economic isolation produced enormous hardship, it also gave Cuba free rein to respond to the crisis of the Special Period in ways that diverged radically from the prevailing neoliberal model. One of the most significant decisions that Cuba will face after the lifting of the U.S. economic embargo is whether to join the World Bank, the [\*483] IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank. n358 With an external debt of approximately $ 12 billion as well as an additional $ 15 billion to $ 20 billion debt to Russia, n359 Cuba might be tempted to avail itself of concessional loans and debt restructuring assistance from the IMF and the World Bank in order to normalize relations with external creditors and to obtain badly needed infusions of capital. Debt relief, however, will come at a very high price. Cuba, like other developing countries, will be compelled to implement neoliberal reforms pursuant to structural adjustment programs overseen by the World Bank and the IMF. These programs will require Cuba to maximize the revenues available for debt service by slashing social spending and vigorously promoting exports. In light of Cuba's "comparative advantage" in agricultural production, it is likely that structural adjustment will result in renewed emphasis on sugar production or on the cultivation of non-traditional agricultural exports (such as flowers, fruits, and vegetables). Cuba will be required to prioritize agricultural exports over domestic food production, to drastically reduce subsidies and social safety nets (including agricultural subsidies and food aid), to privatize state lands and government-owned enterprises, and to open its markets to foreign competition. These reforms would be enacted in conjunction with pre-existing commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture to eliminate non-tariff barriers and reduce tariffs, to phase out domestic subsidies, and to eliminate export subsidies. Cuba would also be obligated under the SPS Agreement to permit the cultivation of genetically modified crops unless Cuba could present strict scientific proof that such cultivation will harm human health or the environment. Since such proof is unlikely given scientific uncertainty regarding the effects of genetically modified organisms, it is likely that Cuba, like Argentina, would become a major cultivator of genetically modified crops. Based on the track record of the neoliberal model in the developing world, it appears that Cuba's adoption of the standard package of neoliberal reforms would jeopardize food security at the national level. First, the neoliberal reforms would undercut domestic food production by diverting prime agricultural land to export production and by requiring Cuba to open its markets to cheap, subsidized food from the United States. This would reduce Cuba's food self-sufficiency and would reinstate Cuba's dangerous dependence on food imports to satisfy basic nutritional needs. Second, renewed emphasis on agricultural exports to generate foreign exchange would make Cuba's trade-based entitlements highly vulnerable to fluctuations in world market agricultural prices and to the declining terms of [\*484] trade for agricultural products. In the terminology of entitlements, Cuba's production-based entitlements would be eroded in favor of highly precarious trade-based entitlements. n360 In addition, a significant percentage of Cuba's export earnings would be earmarked for debt service and thus unavailable for investment or for the importation of food and other vital items. Finally, the cultivation of genetically modified crops would reinstate Cuba's trade dependence on the United States (and subordinate Cuba's food security to U.S. political and economic interests) by shutting Cuba out of lucrative EU markets. The neoliberal model would also jeopardize food security at the household level by fueling rural poverty and inequality. The promotion of export production is likely to provoke a land grab by elite Cubans and transnational corporations at the expense of Cuban smallholders. Export production tends to favor wealthy farmers with ready access to capital who can benefit from economies of scale in both production and marketing and can withstand the dramatic price fluctuations that plague many export commodities. n361 Furthermore, the opening of Cuba's markets to cheap food imports from the United States, in conjunction with the slashing of agricultural subsidies and social safety nets, will threaten the livelihoods of the majority of Cuban farmers and produce economic polarization in rural areas. Finally, the cultivation of genetically modified crops is likely to accelerate the dispossession of small farmers by disrupting the traditional practice of saving, sharing, and breeding seeds. As farmers become increasingly dependent on seeds and other inputs produced by transnational corporations, they may suffer severe economic dislocation if input prices increase or if farm revenues drop. Dispossessed farmers are likely to migrate en masse to towns and cities, thereby straining limited urban amenities. In the terminology of [\*485] entitlements, Cuban smallholders are likely to be deprived of production-based entitlements (land with which to grow food), trade-based entitlements (the ability to buy food on the market with the income generated by agricultural production), labor-based entitlements (due to the loss of jobs to mechanization on the large farms), and transfer-based entitlements (state subsidies and food aid). Neoliberal economic reforms may also jeopardize Cuba's experiment in sustainable agriculture. Export production tends to reinforce ecologically unsustainable monocultures that require extensive application of agrochemicals. These monocultures displace traditional food crops that contribute to soil fertility, pest control, and fodder production. The cultivation of genetically modified crops may exacerbate the problems associated with industrial agriculture by reinforcing monocultural production, eroding biodiversity, and increasing the use of herbicides and insecticides (by accelerating resistance to these products). Even if Cuba is able to capture an export niche in the lucrative market for certified organic products, the introduction of genetically modified organisms may undermine Cuba's efforts by producing genetic contamination. Moreover, the cultivation of Bt crops may injure organic farmers by accelerating resistance to one of the most widely used natural pesticides. Finally, if the cultivation of genetically modified crops results in increased use of herbicides and insecticides, this may harm organic agriculture by killing non-target organisms (including the natural enemies of the target pest and other beneficial insects) and by producing ecosystem-wide disturbances. In short, Cuba's adoption of neoliberal economic reforms threatens to recreate colonial and post-colonial patterns of land tenure and production, whereby the ruling elite and transnational corporations grow export crops on large industrial farms while small-scale producers are relegated to marginal subsistence plots or forced to abandon agriculture altogether. Furthermore, the cultivation of genetically modified crops may re-introduce trade dependency on the United States by foreclosing access to the lucrative European market. The prospects for food security and ecological sustainability under neoliberalism are grim. D. Summary and Conclusion: The Symbolic Significance of Cuba The saga of Cuban agriculture illustrates the ways in which developing countries are structurally disadvantaged in the global trading system by the colonial and post-colonial division of labor that relegates them to the production of primary agricultural commodities. Cuba's integration into the world economy as an exporter of sugar and an importer of manufactured goods and food products so deeply constrained its development options that not even a socialist revolution could alter these pre-existing trade and production patterns. It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the tightening of the U.S. economic embargo that Cuba was forced by external circumstances to diversify its exports, diversify its trading partners, [\*486] decentralize agricultural production, prioritize domestic food production, and promote organic and semi-organic farming techniques. Cuba is **symbolically important** because it demonstrates that there is an alternative to the dominant export-oriented industrial agricultural model and that this alternative can boost agricultural productivity, enhance food security, and protect the environment. n362 However, the transformation of Cuban agriculture was a response to the crisis of the Special Period and was made possible by Cuba's relative economic isolation. Once the U.S. embargo is lifted and Cuba is reintegrated into the global trading system, Cuba, like every other developing country, will face intense pressure to restructure its economy along neoliberal lines. The results could be devastating. It is therefore important to recognize the neoliberal threat, to consider whether neoliberalism can ever be made compatible with food security and ecological sustainability, and to explore alternative strategies for sustainable rural development.

#### US ag can’t resolve global food security – regional investments are key

OGFS, 9. Office of Global Food Security, US Department of State, September 28, 2009. “Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative: Consultation Document.” http://www.state.gov/s/globalfoodsecurity/129952.htm – clawan

The United States alone cannot meet the global need to reduce hunger and promote food security. And foreign assistance alone will not end hunger or eliminate under-nutrition. We must draw on significant investments from other donors, the private sector, partner countries, and citizens themselves. Foreign assistance must play a key role in strengthening public institutions that catalyze private investment rather than hold it back. It must also invest in the experience of the small-scale farmers and business that can succeed by providing them with loans to jumpstart operations. The most effective food security strategies come from those closest to the problems—not governments or institutions thousands of miles away. In the past, our efforts have been undermined by a lack of coordination, limited transparency, uneven monitoring and evaluation, and relationships with recipient countries based more on patronage than partnership. Going forward, we will emphasize consultation and careful analysis of impact and make corrections as we go. While we will increase our own efforts, success will ultimately rest on the shoulders of the farmers and entrepreneurs who wake up each day committed to grow their future. It also will rest on the national and local leaders in their countries who must foster environments where investments in agricultural development can thrive, with zero tolerance for the petty corruption and polices that restrict agriculture-led growth.

#### No environmental extinction

Easterbrook 3 – Distinguished Fellow, Fulbright Foundation (Gregg, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic_set>=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

#### Experts agree there’s no risk from bioterror

O’Neill 4O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

#### Even if terrorists have bioweapons they can’t possibly disperse them

**Smithson 05** Amy E., PhD, project director for biological weapons at the Henry L. Stimson Center.( “Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons” [http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB2001121259) //KY](http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB2001121259)%20//KY)

Terrorists cannot count on just filling the delivery system with agent, pointing the device, and flipping the switch to activate it. Facets that must be deciphered include the concentration of agent in the delivery system, the ways in which the delivery system degrades the potency of the agent, and the right dosage to incapacitate or kill human or animal targets. For open-air delivery, the meteorological conditions must be taken into account. Biological agents have extreme sensitivity to sunlight, humidity, pollutants in the atmosphere, temperature, and even exposure to oxygen, all of which can kill the microbes. Biological agents can be dispersed in either dry or wet forms. Using a dry agent can boost effectiveness because drying and milling the agent can make the particles very fine, a key factor since particles must range between 1 to 10 ten microns, ideally to 1 to 5, to be breathed into the lungs. Drying an agent, however, is done through a complex and challenging process that requires a sophistication of equipment and know-how that terrorist organizations are unlikely to possess. The alternative is to develop a wet slurry, which is much easier to produce but a great deal harder to disperse effectively. Wet slurries can clog sprayers and undergo mechanical stresses that can kill 95 percent or more of the microorganisms.

### 1NC Relations

#### No solvency for relations---Cuba doesn’t want it and doesn’t believe we’ll follow through

Anya Landau French 13, Director of the New America Foundation U.S. – Cuba Policy Initiative, 2/10/13, “Secretary Kerry: Will He or Won't He Take On Cuba?,” http://thehavananote.com/2013/02/secretary\_kerry\_will\_he\_or\_wont\_he\_take\_cuba

And, then there’s the Cuban government. As much as many in the Cuban government (particularly the diplomatic corps) want to reduce tensions with the United States and finally make real progress on long-standing grievances held by both sides, they aren’t desperate for the big thaw. Many U.S. analysts, including in government, speculate that this is because Cuba’s leaders don’t really want to change the relationship, that strife serves their needs better than would the alternative. That could be so, but there’s also a hefty amount of skepticism and pride on the Cuban side, as well. After so many decades and layers of what Cuba calls the U.S. blockade, Cubans are unwilling to have the terms of any ‘surrender’ dictated to them. In fact, they are bound and determined that there will be no surrender. They would argue, what is there to surrender but their government’s very existence, something the leadership obviously isn’t going to put on the table.¶ Many in the Cuban government question whether the U.S. would offer anything that truly matters to Cuba, or honor any commitments made. Arguably, the last deal the U.S. made good on was struck during the Missile Crisis of October 1963, and Cuba wasn’t even at the table for that. It’s a lesser known fact that the United States never fully implemented the 1994/1995 migration accords, which committed both nations to work to prevent migration by irregular means. The U.S. did stop accepting illegal migrants from Cuba found at sea, but it still accepts them when they reach our shores – thus dubbed our ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy. And with our generous adjustment policy offering a green card after one year, the incentive to make the illegal trip remains largely in place.

#### Multiple alt causes prevent sustainable relations

**Llana 2011** [Sara Miller, “A year of drift in US-Latin American relations”, Dec 23, 2011, Christian Science Monitor, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2011/1223/A-year-of-drift-in-US-Latin-American-relations//cc>]

\*human rights

\*immigration

\*drugs

\*china

In March, US President Barack Obama took his first trip to Latin America, stopping off in Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador. In October, the US approved long-awaited free trade deals with Panama and Colombia. According to the 2011 Latinobarometro poll, carried out across 18 countries in the region, President Obama ranked as the most popular leader in the Americas.

This year should have been a stellar one for US-Latin America relations, a major step forward after years of setback. But instead, despite the many positive developments, the relationship is characterized by, if not disdain, then definite distance.

“I think it’s a curious moment,” says Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington. “There is no evidence of great acrimony in US-Latin American relations as there was four or five years ago. But at the same time, there is this sense of distancing and drift, especially between the US and South America.”

The greatest symbol of that is the regional body that was officially launched in December, called the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which includes 33 countries across the Americas but specifically excludes the US and Canada.

Many members of the body are strong allies of the US, but long-time foes such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez have said they hope it counters the other major regional body, the Organization of American States (OAS), based in Washington.

Such old-time arguments still flare. President Chavez, for example, has been weakened at home, as the country’s opposition strengthens ahead of 2012 presidential elections. In theory, that is good for the US, and the rhetoric between the two has been low-key this year. But it just flared again, with Obama sharply criticizing the state of human rights in Venezuela and the country’s relationship with Iran.

“We're concerned about the government's actions, which have restricted the universal rights of the Venezuelan people, threatened basic democratic values, and failed to contribute to the security in the region," Obama wrote in response to questions posed by the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal.

He added that he believes Venezuela’s relationship with Iran has not served the interest of Venezuelans. “Ultimately, it is up to the Venezuelan people to determine what they gain from a relationship with a country that violates universal human rights and is isolated from much of the world,” President Obama said. “Here in the Americas, we take Iranian activities, including in Venezuela, very seriously and we will continue to monitor them closely.”

Chavez countered on state television: "Obama, take care of your own business, focus on governing your country, which you've turned into a disaster. Leave us alone.”

Venezuela’s relationship with Iran is among the most contentious foreign policies issues within the US-Latin American dynamic but other relationships rankle too. The Cuban government, for example, decreed three days of mourning this week in the wake of the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. They joined Venezuela and Nicaragua in expressing condolences.

But in general, the positive has outweighed the negative this year. Perhaps the US’s strongest ally in the region right now is Mexico, where its strategy against organized crime, despite questionable success, is vociferously supported in Washington. The US continues to underline its support.

The trade deal signed with Panama and Colombia strengthens US economic ties to both countries. And the US has restored relations with the economic powerhouse in the region – Brazil. (Trouble had started to brew over former Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s relationship with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.)

Still, on balance, the US is no closer to Latin America than it’s been since 9/11, when attention shifted to terrorism and away from the issues most Latin Americans care about, especially immigration. The region’s favorable view of the US has grown, from 58 percent in 2008 to 72 percent in 2011 (down slightly from a high of 74 percent in 2009), according to the 2011 Latinobarometro poll. The slight dip can be explained by a boost in expectations for Obama after former US President George W. Bush left office – he was widely reviled in Latin America. But even under Obama issues like immigration and drugs have been stuck. There is little hope of them getting “unstuck” in the upcoming US election year.

More than anything, however, is the simple fact that the US is no longer the sole player for Latin America. Obama's March trip was billed by the media as an effort to recapture US influence in Latin America. But Latin America has moved on. Countries are looking amongst themselves and much farther, particularly to China, to bolster their economies. They are forming their own relationships with countries, whether the US likes it or not. Of course US foreign policy matters here, but it matters so much less than it used to.

“There is just a sense that Latin America is pursuing its own agenda,” says Mr. Shifter.

#### Removing the embargo does not guarantee relations with Cuba – turns democracy

National Review, 09 – (Editors of the National Review, “Embrace Trade, Not Chávez”, National Review Online, APRIL 21, 2009, [http://www.nationalreview.com/node/227336/print)//SP](http://www.nationalreview.com/node/227336/print)/SP)

This past weekend’s Summit of the Americas, in Trinidad and Tobago, was a carnival of platitudes and absurdities. As a “gift,” Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez gave Pres. Barack Obama a radical-left history book written by Uruguayan author Eduardo Galeano. Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega delivered a buffoonish anti-U.S. rant that lasted 50 minutes. Press coverage of the summit was dominated by talk of the Obama-Chávez meeting, the Ortega harangue, and the weakening of U.S. sanctions against Cuba. We are deeply skeptical of any U.S. rapprochement with Venezuela. Chávez is not simply a vulgar loudmouth; he is an authoritarian who has pulverized Venezuelan democracy, brutalized his political opponents, aided narcoterrorists in Colombia, and sought a partnership with Iran. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the Chávez regime is guilty of “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers.” As for Cuba, Obama himself continues to support the U.S. embargo. So do we. No, it has not toppled the Castro dictatorship, but it is a tool. Cuba will only liberalize when its rulers decide to liberalize. If and when they do, the embargo should be lifted. Until then, we see no reason to reward the Cuban government with a massive unilateral concession. We realize that farm-state politicians are eager for their constituents to gain access to the Cuban market. Their desire to end U.S. sanctions has nothing to do with Cuban freedom. Many of our libertarian friends argue that ditching the embargo would spur a loosening of Cuba’s economic and political controls. We wish it were that easy. Thus far, trading with the rest of the world has not persuaded Havana to hold free elections, release political prisoners, or even adopt Chinese-style economic reforms. What about “flooding” the island with American tourists? European and Canadian tourists have been swarming Cuba’s beaches and hotels for many years now. This has done nothing to ease political repression. Would lifting the embargo improve our image in Latin America? Perhaps, on balance, it would. But that alone is not a compelling reason to lift sanctions. Our Cuba policy should be designed to increase freedom for Cubans, not to curry favor among Latin governments that have neglected their democratic brethren in Castro’s island gulag. In his opening remarks to the summit, Obama proclaimed “a new chapter” of U.S. engagement with the Western Hemisphere — “based on mutual respect and common interests and shared values.” We hope that means Obama will pressure congressional Democrats to ratify the U.S.-Colombia free-trade deal, but we’re not holding our breath. His call for “a new chapter” in hemispheric relations was an implicit dig at the Bush administration. The conventional wisdom is that Bush “ignored” Latin America or was “disengaged” from the region. This charge is unfair. Among other things, the Bush administration played a key role in helping Brazil and Uruguay cope with the aftermath of the 2001 Argentine financial meltdown: It secured a $30 billion IMF package for Brazil and a $1.5 billion U.S. Treasury loan for Uruguay. Bush also signed free-trade pacts with Chile, Central America and the Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA), Peru, Colombia, and Panama. He broadened “Plan Colombia” and provided valuable assistance to the Uribe administration in its fight against leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries. He launched the $1.4 billion Mérida Initiative to combat drug trafficking and crime in Mexico and Central America. And he championed a bold immigration plan that bitterly divided the Republican party and hurt his popularity among conservatives. In short, the idea that Bush ignored Latin America is bunk. There’s no question that the Bush administration shifted its focus after 9/11 — for obvious and understandable reasons — and that Latin America took a back seat to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other challenges. So far, President Obama has likewise spent far more time on the Middle East, Asia, and Europe than he has on the Western Hemisphere. Over the short term, Obama’s priorities in Latin America should be to aid the Mexican government in its bloody war against the drug cartels; to support Central American countries in their own struggles against violent crime (much of it fueled by gangs and drugs); to win congressional approval of the pending free-trade agreements with Colombia and Panama; and to enhance U.S. ties with Brazil, the region’s emerging giant. For now, at least, pursuing détente with Venezuela and Cuba would only be a fruitless distraction.

#### There is no correlation between democracy and peace.

**Rosato ’3** – Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame (Sebastian, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” The American Political Science Review, November 2003, <http://rrii.150m.com/t08/Sebastian%20Rosato%20-%20The%20Flawed%20Logic%20of%20Democratic%20Peace%20Theory.pdf>)//SS

**The causal logics that underpin democratic peace the-** ¶ **ory cannot explain why democracies remain at peace** ¶ **with one another because the mechanisms that make up** ¶ **these logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory's** ¶ **proponents**. In the case of the normative logic, **liberal** ¶ **democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic** ¶ **norms of conflict resolution and do not treat one an-** ¶ **other with trust and respect when their interests clash.** ¶ Similarly, in the case of the institutional logic, **demo-** ¶ **cratic leaders are not especially accountable to peace-** ¶ **loving publics or pacific interest groups, democracies** ¶ **are not particularly slow to mobilize or incapable of sur-** ¶ **prise attack, and open political competition offers no** ¶ **guarantee that a democracy will reveal private informa-** ¶ **tion about its level of resolve.** In view of these findings ¶ there are good reasons to doubt that joint democracy ¶ causes peace. ¶ Democratic peace theorists could counter this claim ¶ by pointing out that even in the absence of a good ex- ¶ planation for the democratic peace, the fact remains ¶ that democracies have rarely fought one another. In ¶ addition to casting doubt on existing explanations for ¶ the democratic peace, then, a comprehensive critique ¶ should also offer a positive account of the finding. ¶ **One potential explanation is that the democratic** ¶ **peace is in fact an imperial peace** based on American ¶ power. This claim rests on two observations. First, the ¶ democratic peace is essentially a post-World War II ¶ phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western ¶ Europe. Second, the United States has been the dom- ¶ inant power in both these regions since World War II ¶ and has placed an overriding emphasis on regional ¶ peace. ¶ There are three reasons we should expect democratic ¶ peace theory's empirical claims to hold only in the post- ¶ 1945 period. First, as even proponents of the demo- ¶ cratic peace have admitted, there were few democracies¶ in the international system prior to 1945 and even fewer ¶ that were in a position to fight one another. **Since 1945,** ¶ **however, both the number of democracies in the in-** ¶ **ternational system and the number that have had an** ¶ **opportunity to fight one another have grown markedly** ¶ (e.g., Russett 1993,20). Second, while members of dou- ¶ ble democratic dyads were not significantly less likely to ¶ fight one another than members of other types of dyads ¶ prior to World War 11, they have been significantly ¶ more peaceful since then (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1997). ¶ Third, **the farther back we go in history the harder it** ¶ **is to find a consensus among both scholars and poli-** ¶ **cymakers on what states qualify as democracies.** De- ¶ pending on whose criteria we use, there may have been ¶ no democratic wars prior to 1945, or there may have ¶ been several (see, e.g., Layne 1994; Ray 1995; Russett ¶ 1993; Spiro 1994). Since then, however, we can be fairly ¶ certain that democracies have hardly fought each other ¶ at all. ¶ Most of the purely democratic dyads since World ¶ War I1 can be found in the Americas and Western ¶ Europe. My analysis includes all pairs of democracies ¶ directly or indirectly contiguous to one another or sep- ¶ arated by less than 150 miles of water between 1950 and ¶ 1990 (Przeworski et al. 2000; Schafer 1993). This yields ¶ 2,427 double democratic dyads, of which 1.306 (54%) ¶ were comprised of two European states, 465 (19%) ¶ were comprised of two American states, and 418 (17%) ¶ comprised one American state and one European state. ¶ In short, 90% of purely democratic dyads have been ¶ confined to two geographic regions, the Americas and ¶ Western Europe. ¶ American preponderance has underpinned, and con- ¶ tinues to underpin stability and peace in both of these ¶ regions. In the Americas the United States has suc- ¶ cessfully adopted a two-pronged strategy of driving ¶ out the European colonial powers and selectively in- ¶ tervening either to ensure that regional conflicts do ¶ not escalate to the level of serious military conflict or ¶ to install regimes that are sympathetic to its interests. ¶ The result has been a region in which most states are ¶ prepared to toe the American line and none have pre- ¶ tensions to alter the status quo. In Europe, the expe- ¶ rience of both World Wars persuaded American poli- ¶ cymakers that U.S. interests lay in preventing the con- ¶ tinent ever returning to the security competition that ¶ had plagued it since the Napoleonic Wars. Major ini- ¶ tiatives including the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic ¶ Treaty, European integration, and the forward deploy- ¶ ment of American troops on German soil should all ¶ be viewed from this perspective. Each was designed ¶ either to protect the European powers from one an- ¶ other or to constrain their ability to act as sovereign ¶ states, thereby preventing a return to multipolarity ¶ and eliminating the security dilemma as a factor in ¶ European politics. These objectives continue to pro- ¶ vide the basis for Washington's European policy today ¶ and explain its continued attachment to NATO and its ¶ support for the eastward expansion of the European ¶ Union. In sum, the United States has been by far the ¶ most dominant state in both the Americas and Western ¶ Europe since World War II and has been committed,¶ above all, to ensuring that both regions remain at peace. **Evaluating whether the democratic peace finding is** ¶ **caused by democracy or by some other factor such** ¶ **as American preponderance has implications far be-** ¶ **yond the academy**. If peace and security are indeed a ¶ consequence of shared democracy, then international ¶ democratization should continue to lie at the heart of ¶ American grand strategy. But if, as I have suggested, ¶ **democracy does not cause peace**, then **American poli-** ¶ **cymakers are expending valuable resources on a policy** ¶ **that, while morally praiseworthy, does not make** ¶ **America more secure.**

#### Terrorists aren’t pursuing nuclear attacks

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If one were to read the most recent unclassified report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions, it does have a section on CBRN terrorism (note, not WMD terrorism). The intelligence community has a very toned down statement that says “several terrorist groups … probably remain interested in [CBRN] capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of those capabilities. … mostly focusing on low-level chemicals and toxins.” They’re talking about terrorists getting industrial chemicals and making ricin toxin, not nuclear weapons. And yes, Ms. Squassoni, it is primarily al Qaeda that the U.S. government worries about, no one else. The trend of worldwide terrorism continues to remain in the realm of conventional attacks. In 2010, there were more than 11,500 terrorist attacks, affecting about 50,000 victims including almost 13,200 deaths. None of them were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,000 terrorist attacks in 2009, none were caused by CBRN hazards. Of the 11,800 terrorist attacks in 2008, none were caused by CBRN hazards.

#### Structural problems with the OAS coopt solvency

**AP 6/4** (Associated Press, “John Kerry seeks changes to OAS,” 6/4/13, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/john-kerry-latin-america-oas-changes-92245.html)//SJF

Secretary of State John Kerry is demanding reforms in the 35-nation Organization of American States as he visits Latin America for the first time since taking office. Leading the U.S. delegation in Guatemala to the annual general assembly of the OAS — an organization he has disparaged as ineffective, inefficient and nearly irrelevant — Kerry will try to convince fellow members of the need for major changes in its bureaucracy and a return to its core mission of promoting human rights, democracy and development. Gutierrez dares GOP to vote down bill Bill reduces benefits for lobbyists Rhee's group tripled its budget Balz book: Christie considered 2012 Udall brother 'hiked everywhere' SEIU pushes House on immigration Officials traveling with Kerry said he also would be making the case against legalization of marijuana at the national level, lobbying for the election of the U.S. candidate for a hemispheric human rights panel and trying to improve badly damaged relations with Venezuela. Kerry arrived Tuesday at the Guatemalan mountain resort of Antigua and began his two-day program with a meeting with Guatemala’s president. Drugs, U.S. immigration reform and good governance were to top the agenda in those talks, the two men told reporters. The OAS often is criticized in the United States and Kerry wrote a scathing editorial about its failures and need to reform three years ago while he was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He then introduced legislation in Congress aimed at requiring significant budget reforms in the organization. Just last year, shortly before he was nominated to be secretary of state, Kerry penned a letter to **the OAS** permanent council with three other senators bemoaning that the group “**has been forfeiting its effectiveness” with a lack of strategic focus and fiscal recklessness.** The State Department said Monday that Kerry believed the bloc was an organization of critical importance to the Americas and that his participation in the general assembly was aimed at helping to strengthen it. “The fact that he is going to the OAS and he is spending two days there participating sends a clear signal that he thinks this remains the premier multilateral organization in the hemisphere,” department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said. “**In order to assure that the OAS retains** that **status, it must refocus on its core principles**,” she said, stressing democracy, human rights, development and regional security. “Strengthening it is of course part of (Kerry’s) agenda and part of what he’ll be focused on in the next couple of days.” As a senator in 2010, Kerry made similar, though not as subtle, points in an opinion piece he co-wrote with Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), his successor as head of the Foreign Relations Committee. “**Sadly, its culture of consensus has often been the breeding ground of the ideas that reflect the lowest common denominator, rather than the highest ambitions of diplomacy and cooperation**,” they wrote in The Miami Herald. **The pair excoriated the OAS for becoming “a pliable tool of inconsistent political agendas” and suggested that they agreed with critics who called the organization “a grazing pasture for third-string diplomats.”** Psaki played down the last comment, saying she “would hardly call the secretary of state a third-string diplomat.” Kerry’s mere presence at the meeting demonstrates his and the Obama administration’s commitment to improving the OAS, she said. In November 2012, Kerry and Menendez, along with Republican Sens. Richard Lugar of Indiana and Marco Rubio of Florida, wrote that OAS finances had become dangerously precarious and that it must reform, pare back superfluous projects or risk losing support from its prime contributor, the United States. The United States has over the past decades found itself at growing odds with numerous Latin and South American members of the OAS. Many of them, like Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, are led by leftist or populist leaders who have balked at accepting the dominance of the U.S. in the Americas and pursued policies that often run counter to Washington’s wishes. Apart from Cuba, which has been suspended from the OAS for decades, the U.S. has most differences with Venezuela, whose president, Hugo Chavez, reveled in tweaking Washington until his death last year.

#### No nuclear terror – counter to the goals of terror groups.

Kapur ‘8

(S. Paul; Associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32)

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer I999: 4-5), extensive empirical evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact be­have rationally, adopting strategies designed to achieve particular ends (Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? For certain types of terrorist objectives, nuclear weapons could be too de­structive. Large-scale devastation could negatively influence audiences important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist orga­nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home­land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counter­productive for the terrorists in this scenario.

#### No nuclear retal

Washington Post ‘7

(Thursday, August 2, 2007 – “Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror” – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375\_pf.html)

Presidential hopeful Barack Obama said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals."I think it would be a profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians." Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."

# 2NC

## Neolib

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#### No impact uniqueness – neolib makes extinction inevitable

Richard A. Smith 7, Research Associate at the Institute for Policy Research & Development, UK; PhD in History from UCLA, June 2007, “The Eco-suicidal Economics of Adam Smith,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 22-43

So there you have it: insatiable growth and consumption is destroying the planet and dooming humanity-but without ceaselessly growing production and insatiably rising consumption, we would be even worse off. Such is the lunatic suicidal logic of capitalist economics. Adam Smith's fatal error was his assumption that the "most effectual" means of promoting the public interest of society is to just ignore it and concentrate instead on the pursuit of economic self-interest. In the 18th century, this narcissistic economic philosophy had little impact on the natural world. Today it has a huge impact and is, moreover, totally at odds with the world's scientific bodies who are crying out for a PLAN to stop global warming and save nature. Capitalist Limits to Corporate Environmentalist!! Corporations aren't necessarily evil, but corporate managers are legally responsible to their owners, the shareholders, and not to society. This means that the critical decisions about production and resource consumption-decisions that affect our health and survival-are mainly the private prerogative of large corporations and are often only marginally under the control of governments. The blunt reality of this situation was well summed up by Joel Bakan in his recent book (and film), The Corporation: Corporations are created by law and imbued with purpose by law. Law dictates what their directors and managers can do, what they cannot do, and what they must do. And, at least in the United States and other industrialized countries, the corporation, as created by law, most closely resembles Milton Friedman's ideal model of the institution: it compels executives to prioritize the interests of their companies and shareholders above all others and forbids them from being socially responsible - at least genuinely so.38 So when corporate and societal interests conflict, even the "greenest" of corporate CEOs often have no choice but to make decisions contrary to the interests of society. British Petroleum's CEO, Lord John Browne, is good example. In the late 1990s, Browne had an environmental epiphany, broke ranks with oil industry denial, and became the first oil company executive to warn that fossil fuels are accelerating global warming. BP adopted the motto "Beyond Petroleum" in its advertisements, painted its service stations green and yellow, and bought a boutique solar power outfit. But under Browne, BP has spent far more on advertising its green credentials than it invests in actual green power production. Fully 99 percent of its investments still go into fossil fuel exploration and development, while solar power is less than 1 percent and seems to be declining. 9 In 1999, BP spent $45 million to buy the solar power outfit Solarex. By comparison, BP paid $26.8 billion to buy Amoco in order to enlarge its oil portfolio. BP's 2004 revenues topped $285 billion, while its solar power sales were just over $400 million. In February 2006, Browne told his board that the company had more than replenished its marketed output in 2005 with new proven reserves of oil and gas, and that "with more than 20 new projects due on stream in the next three years, and assuming the same level of oil price, the annual rate of increase should continue at some 4 percent through 2010."40 So, far from shifting to renewable sources of energy, BP is not only expanding its output of fossil fuels but increasing its overall reliance on fossil fuel sources of profit. BP now possesses proven reserves of 19 billion barrels produced in 23 countries, and the company currently explores for oil in 26 countries. Given the proven and stupendous profits of oil production versus the unproven profitability of alternative energy, how can Brown go "green" in any serious way and remain responsible to his owner-investors?41 Were he to do so, he would soon be out of a job.42 Ecosocialism or Collapse If we're going to stop the capitalist economic locomotive from driving us off the cliff, we are going to have to fundamentally rethink our entire economic life, reassert the visible hand of conscious scientific, rational economic planning, and implement democratic control over our economies and resources. We're going to have to construct an entirely different kind of economy, one that can live within its ecological means. Such an economy would have to be based around at least the following principles: An Ecosocialist Economy of Stasis First, in a world of fast-diminishing resources, a sustainable global economy can only be based on near-zero economic growth on average. That means that to survive, humanity will have to impose drastic fixed limits on development, resource consumption, the freedom to consume, and the freedom to pollute. Given existing global inequities and the fact that the crisis we face is overwhelmingly caused by overconsumption in the industrialized North, equity can only be achieved by imposing massive cutbacks in the advanced countries combined with a program of rational planned growth to develop the Third World, with the aim of stabilizing at zero growth on average. This will require drastically cutting back many lines of production, closing down others entirely, and creating socially and environmentally useful jobs for workers made redundant by this transition. This will also require physical rationing of many critical resources on a per capita basis for every person on the planet. Human survival will thus require a profound rethinking of our most fundamental ideas-bourgeois ideas-of economic freedom. For too long, many Americans, in particular, have come to identify their notion of "freedom," if not their very being and essence, with insatiable consumption-unlimited freedom of "choice" in what to buy. But 50 styles of blue jeans, 16 models of SUVs and endless choices in "consumer electronics" will all have dramatically less value when Bloomingdales is under water, Florida disappears beneath the waves, malarial mosquitos blanket Long Island beaches, and the U.S. is overrun with desperate environmental refugees from the South. Once we as a society finally admit the "inconvenient truth" that we have no choice but to drastically cut production and severely reduce consumer choice, it will also become apparent that we have to put in place a planned economy that will meet our needs and those of future generations as well as the other species with whom we share the planet. A Restructured Economy of Production for Social Need and for Use Second, we need to massively restructure the global economy. Enormous sectors in the global capitalist economy-plastics, packaging, much of the manufactured consumer electronics, petrochemical-based and other synthetic products, many pharmaceuticals, all genetically modified foods, and the vast and ever-growing production of arms-are either completely unnecessary or waste increasingly scarce resources and produce needless pollution.44 Our parents did without nearly all of this before WWII, and they were not living in caves. Many lines of production and most retail industries are built around unnecessary replacement and designed-in obsolescence. How much of the American economy from cars and appliances to clothes is purposefully designed to be "consumed, burned up, worn out, replaced, and discarded at an ever-increasing rate"46 so the cycle of waste production can begin all over again? How much of the planet's natural resources are consumed every year in completely unnecessary annual model changes, fashion updates, and "new and improved" products whose only purpose is simply to sell and sell again? If a global population of 6 to 9 billion people is going to survive this century, what choice do we have but to reorganize the global economy to conserve what shrinking natural resources we have left, reorient production for need rather than profit, design products to last as long as possible, enforce as close to total recycling as possible, and aim for as close to zero pollution as is possible? A Socialist Economic Democracy Third: an ecosocialist democracy. Endless growth or stasis? Resource exhaustion or conservation? Automobilization of the planet or enhanced public transport? Deforestation or protection of the wild forests? Agro poisons or organic farming? Hunt the fish to extinction or protect the fisheries? Raze the Amazon forest to grow MacBurgers or promote a more vegetarian diet? Manufacture products designed to be "used up, burned up, consumed as rapidly as possible" or design them to last, be repaired, recycled and also shared? Enforce private interests at the expense of the commons or subordinate private greed to the common good? In today's globalized world, decisions about such questions will determine the fate of humanity. Who can make these critical economic and moral decisions in society's interest and in the interest of preserving a habitable planet? In Adam Smith's view, which is still the operable maxim of modern capitalists and neoliberal economists, we should all just "Look out for Number 1," and the common good will take care of itself. If Smith were right, the common good would have taken care of itself long ago, and we wouldn't be facing catastrophe. After centuries of Smithian economics, the common good needs our immediate and concentrated attention. Corporations can't make such decisions in the best interests of society or the future, because their legal responsibility is to their private owners. The only way such decisions can be scientifically rational and socially responsible is when everyone who is affected participates in decision-making. And time is running out. We don't have 20 or 30 years to wait for Ford and GM to figure out how they can make a buck on electric cars. We don't have 60 or 70 years to wait while investors in coal-powered power plants milk the last profits out of those sunk investments before they consider an alternative. Humanity is at a crossroads. Either we find a way to move toward a global economic democracy in which decisions about production and consumption are directly and democratically decided by all those affected, or the alternative will be the continuing descent into a capitalist war of all-against-all over ever-diminishing resources that can only end in the collapse of what's left of civilization and the global ecology. To be sure, in an economic democracy, society would sometimes make mistakes in planning. We can't have perfect foresight, and democracies make mistakes. But at least these would be honest mistakes. The conclusion seems inescapable: Either we democratize the economy, construct the institutions of a practical working socialist democracy, or we face ecological and social collapse.

#### You have an *ethical obligation* to reject neoliberalism – it degrades all human life in an attempt to profit

Morgareidge, 98 – professor of philosophy at Lewis and Clark (Clayton, “Why capitalism is evil”, 1998, <http://www.lclark.edu/~clayton/commentaries/evil.html>)

¶ To show why this is the case, let me turn to capital's greatest critic, Karl Marx. Under capitalism, Marx writes, everything in nature and everything that human beings are and can do becomes an object: a resource for, or an obstacle, to the expansion of production, the development of technology, the growth of markets, and the circulation of money. For those who manage and live from capital, nothing has value of its own. Mountain streams, clean air, human lives -- all mean nothing in themselves, but are valuable only if they can be used to turn a profit.[1] If capital looks at (not into) the human face, it sees there only eyes through which brand names and advertising can enter and mouths that can demand and consume food, drink, and tobacco products. If human faces express needs, then either products can be manufactured to meet, or seem to meet, those needs, or else, if the needs are incompatible with the growth of capital, then the faces expressing them must be unrepresented or silenced. ¶ Obviously what capitalist enterprises do have consequences for the well being of human beings and the planet we live on. Capital profits from the production of food, shelter, and all the necessities of life. The production of all these things uses human lives in the shape of labor, as well as the resources of the earth. If we care about life, if we see our obligations in each others faces, then we have to want all the things capital does to be governed by that care, to be directed by the ethical concern for life. But feeding people is not the aim of the food industry, or shelter the purpose of the housing industry. In medicine, making profits is becoming a more important goal than caring for sick people. As capitalist enterprises these activities aim single-mindedly at the accumulation of capital, and such purposes as caring for the sick or feeding the hungry becomes a mere means to an end, an instrument of corporate growth. Therefore ethics, the overriding commitment to meeting human need, is left out of deliberations about what the heavyweight institutions of our society are going to do. Moral convictions are expressed in churches, in living rooms, in letters to the editor, sometimes even by politicians and widely read commentators, but almost always with an attitude of resignation to the inevitable. People no longer say, "You can't stop progress," but only because they have learned not to call economic growth progress. They still think they can't stop it. And they are right -- as long as the production of all our needs and the organization of our labor is carried out under private ownership. Only a minority ("idealists") can take seriously a way of thinking that counts for nothing in real world decision making. Only when the end of capitalism is on the table will ethics have a seat at the table.¶

#### Inequality and structural violence is the *root cause* of your impacts – it outweighs

Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

### 2nc a2: fw

#### We must analyze both ideology AND policy to affect political practice

Larner 2K (Wendy Larner, Professor of Human Geography and Sociology, Research Director and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law, University of Bristol, Ph.D., M.A., B.S., “Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality,” Studies in Political Economy, 63, Autumn 2000, [http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/download/6724/3723‎](http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/download/6724/3723%E2%80%8E))

Introduction¶ The term ''neo-liberalism'' denotes new forms of¶ political-economic governance premised on the extension of¶ market relationships. In critical social science literatures, the¶ term has usurped labels referring to specific political projects¶ (Thatcherism, Regeanomics, Rogemomics), and is more widely¶ used than its counterparts including, for example, economic rationalism,¶ monetarism, neo-conservatism, managerialism and contractualism.'¶ Indeed, Jane Jenson recently used "neo-liberal" as a¶ general descriptor for post-welfare state citizenship regimes.2It is¶ in this context that I re-assess existing analyses of neo-liberalism.¶ The imperative for this examination arises from my growing conviction¶ that many critical commentators have underestimated the¶ significance of neo-liberalism for contemporary forms of governance¶ and, as such, have been largely unable to engage in the¶ formulation of an effective "post-social politics."3¶ At first glance the object of my enquiry appears self-evident.¶ Internationally, conservative and social democratic governments¶ alike are involved in debates over welfare state processes.¶ Whereas under Keynesian welfarism the state provision of goods¶ and services to a national population was understood as a means¶ of ensuring social well-being, neo-liberalism is associated with the¶ preference for a minimalist state. Markets are understood to be a¶ better way of organizing economic activity because they are associated¶ with competition, economic efficiency and choice. In conjunction¶ with this general shift towards the neo-liberal tenet of¶ "more market," deregulation and privatization have become central¶ themes in debates over welfare state restructuring.¶ This paper claims that neo-liberalism is a more complex phenomenon¶ than may have been recognized by many participants in¶ these debates. In order to address this claim, the first part of the¶ paper identifies three different interpretations of neo-liberalism. I¶ distinguish between analyses that understand neo-liberalism as a¶ policy framework, those that portray neo-liberalism as an ideology¶ and those who conceptualize neo-liberalism through the lens of¶ governmentality. I show that each of these interpretations of neoliberalism¶ has different implications for understandings of the¶ restructuring of welfare state processes and for the envisaging of¶ political strategies that might further aspirations for social justice¶ and collective forms of well-being. In this context, it should be¶ immediately apparent that this delineation of the different interpretations¶ of neo-liberalism is not simply an academic exercise;¶ our understandings of this phenomenon shape our readings of the¶ scope and content of possible political interventions.¶ I argue that analyses that characterize neo-liberalism as either a¶ policy response to the exigencies of the global economy, or the¶ capturing of the policy agenda by the "New Right," run the risk of¶ under-estimating the significance of contemporary transformations¶ in governance. Neo-liberalism is both a political discourse¶ about the nature of rule and a set of practices that facilitate the¶ governing of individuals from a distance. In this regard, understanding¶ neo-liberalism as governmentality opens useful avenues¶ for the investigation of the restructuring of welfare state processes.¶ At the same time, however, I suggest that the insights of the¶ governmentality literature should be enhanced by those from feminist¶ and other critical theorizing in which contested nature of discursive¶ practices is centred. In this regard:¶ Those whose aim it is to create knowledge that will assist social contestation¶ should take on the difficult work of understanding actual and¶ possible contests and struggles around rule, and our theories should¶ enable rather than prevent such projects.t¶ Neo-Iiberalism as Policy The most common conceptualization¶ of neo-liberalism is as a policy framework-marked by a shift¶ from Keynesian welfarism towards a political agenda favouring¶ the relatively unfettered operation of markets. Often this renewed¶ emphasis on markets is understood to be directly associated with¶ the so-called globalization of capital. The argument is a familiar¶ one. New forms of globalized production relations and financial¶ systems are forcing governments to abandon their commitment to¶ the welfare state.>Rather than formulating policies to ensure full¶ employment and an inclusive social welfare system, governments¶ are now focused on enhancing economic efficiency and international¶ competitiveness. One consequence is the "rolling back" of¶ welfare state activities, and a new emphasis on market provisioning¶ of formerly "public" goods and services.¶ Analysts tend to attribute this shift in policy agendas to the capture¶ of key institutions and political actors by a particular political¶ Ideology (with a capital "I"), a body of ideas or a worldview.e This¶ body of ideas is understood to rest on five values: the individual;¶ freedom of choice; market security; laissez faire, and minimal¶ government." These values underpin the new institutional economics¶ (built on public choice theory, transactions cost theory and¶ principal-agency theory) which, together with a new emphasis on¶ managerialism, comprise the intellectual basis of the neo-liberal¶ challenge to Keynesian welfarism, and provide the theoretical¶ impetus for deregulation and privatization. In tum, this new intellectual¶ agenda has been popularized by think tanks and corporate¶ decision makers, backed by powerful international organizers¶ such as the IMF and the World Bank.s¶ The widespread adoption of this system of ideas, which has¶ resulted in a free market version of restructuring, is attributed to¶ the influence of key politicians and/or political organizations.¶ Politicians such as Thatcher and Reagan are most often mentioned,¶ together with their counterparts elsewhere, such as¶ Mulroney and Douglas.? Other analyses focus on the importance¶ of Finance Departments and Treasury advisers.tv Finally, a wide¶ set of both public and private interests, particularly those representing¶ multi-national capital, are identified as supportive of market¶ liberalism. I I In each analytical case, however, it is assumed¶ that neo-liberalism is a policy reform programme initiated and¶ rationalized through a relatively coherent theoretical and¶ Ideological framework.¶ Of course there is a healthy internal debate amongst those who¶ understand neo-liberalism as a policy agenda. Public choice theory,¶ to give just one example, has been challenged on numerous¶ grounds.u It is also clear that neo-liberal policies are differentially¶ applied. In their discussion of New Zealand's model of public¶ management, for example, Jonathon Boston and his colleagues¶ stress that, "As is often the case, broad overarching terms, such as¶ the NPM, can shelter within them a wealth of policy diversity."13¶ My point is, however, that despite debate and diversity within this¶ literature, the key actors are understood to be politicians and policy¶ makers, and component parts of the neo-liberal policy agenda¶ are seen as mutually reinforcing. Indeed, the very use of the word¶ agenda "denotes a coherent program of things to be done."14¶ Such analyses constitute the vast majority of popular interpretations,¶ as well as many academic commentaries on neo-liberalism.¶ Understandably, for many such observers the extension of¶ market relations is highly problematic. More specifically, deregulation¶ and privatization are identified as transferring power away¶ from democratically elected governments with a mandate to¶ ensure universal service provision, towards private capital concerned¶ primarily with furthering opportunities for accumulation.¶ In turn, this shift from public to private sector is understood to¶ erode the foundations of both national economies and traditional¶ social solidarities. As Susan Strange has observed, "that these¶ changes have to a large extent emasculated state control over¶ national economies and societies has almost become a journalistic¶ platitude."15¶ In these analyses the response to neo-liberalism tends to take¶ the form of arguments over the success, or otherwise, of policy¶ programmes. Consequently the outcomes of neo-liberal policy¶ reforms predominate in these debates. In New Zealand, for example,¶ quantitative research based on macro-economic indicators is¶ used to dispute the efficacy of the shift towards "more market."16¶ Social policy analysts have demonstrated that increased social and¶ spatial polarization is amongst the consequences of neo-liberal¶ reform.I?¶ It is also argued that neo-liberalism has exaggerated¶ swings in the business cycle. The most common response to the¶ shift to a minimalist non-interventionist state is an argument for¶ the reintroduction of forms of state control that will attenuate the¶ power of the market and prioritize the re-establishment of national¶ control. Thus a change in the policy agenda, involving a return¶ to the more protectionist stance associated with Keynesian welfarism,¶ is seen as the primary solution to the problems generated¶ by neo-liberalism.¶ My argument is that while accounts of neo-liberalism as policy¶ serve a useful purpose in terms of elaborating the consequences of¶ welfare state restructuring, as an explanation of the phenomenon¶ itself they may raise more questions than they answer. It is notable¶ that, for example, that while very few political parties explicitly¶ identify themselves as neo-liberal, adherence to market-based pol-¶ icy options characterize the current policy programmes of social¶ democratic and conservative governments alike. Assuming a critical¶ distance from the tenets of neo-liberalism, in particular the¶ preference for market mechanisms as a means of ensuring social¶ well-being, how is it that such a massive transformation in the policy-¶ making agenda has been achieved?¶ Moreover, given the tenuous empirical claims and lack of intellectual¶ rigour on which this policy agenda appears to be based,¶ how is it possible to explain the tenacity of ideas associated with¶ neo-liberalism? For as political scientist Janine Brodie has¶ observed, "changing public expectations about citizenship entitlements,¶ the collective provision of social needs, and the efficacy of¶ the welfare state has been a critical victory for neo-liberalism."18¶ It is noticeable in New Zealand, for example, that despite the¶ apparent unpopularity of the so-called "free market revolution,"¶ many political claims are now framed in the language of choice,¶ flexibility and the market.i? In short, how do we account for the¶ apparent success of neo-liberalism in shaping both political programmes¶ and individual subjectivities?¶ Neo-Iiberalism as Ideology Neo-Marxist and socialist-feminist¶ theorizations of neo-liberalism provide useful means of addressing¶ these questions, and thus constitute the second interpretation of¶ neo-liberalism to be discussed in this paper. This might be seen as¶ a more "sociological" approach to neo-liberalism in which a wider¶ range of institutions, organizations and processes are considered.¶ Best known of these are the analyses of Thatcherism associated¶ with British theorist Stuart Hall. Rejecting the "classic variant" of¶ the Marxist theory of ideology, namely the idea that the ruling ideas¶ are the ideas of the ruling class, Hall argues that the power of¶ Thatcherism was its ability to constitute subject positions from¶ which its discourses about the world made sense to people in a¶ range of different social positions.s? In doing so Thatcherism¶ "changed the currency of political thought and argument" and¶ marked the consolidation of a new ideological hegemony based on¶ the tenets of neo-Iiberalism.u¶ In arguing that Thatcherism was an ideological transformation,¶ Hall makes explicit three points: first, that neo-liberalism is not¶ simply a system of ideas, nor a lurch to the Right in the formulation¶ of policy agendas; second, that power is not constituted and¶ exercised exclusively on the terrain of the state; third, that hege-¶ mony is only achieved through an ongoing process of contestation¶ and struggle. Strongly influenced by Gramsci, his claim is that¶ Thatcherism is best understood as a "struggle to gain ascendancy¶ over the entire social formation, to achieve positions of leadership¶ in a number of different sites of social life at once, to achieve the¶ commanding position on a broad strategic front."22¶ Most immediately, the strength of this work is that it does not¶ underestimate the contradictions and complexities of Thatcherism¶ as a concrete political phenomenon. In particular, Hall was concerned¶ with the fact that Thatcherism had managed to articulate¶ the interests of a wide range of groups in Britain, thereby clearing¶ the way for the reassertion of market forces. Moreover, rather than¶ understanding the ideology of the "New Right" as a coherent¶ corpus, he emphasized the different threads of this ideological¶ formation; in this case, the tensions between a "pure" neo-liberal¶ ideology premised on the individual and free market, and a more¶ traditional conservative ideology based on family and nation.¶ Finally, his work opens the crucial question of identity. Rather¶ than dismissing the attraction of the English working class to¶ Thatcherism as "false consciousness," he explored the ways in¶ which individual and group understandings were reconstructed¶ through and against these ideological processes.¶ Hall's analysis of Thatcherism was, in part, an intellectual¶ response to apparent political acquiescence of the British working¶ class to neo-liberal tenets. As the articles in Morley and Chen suggest,¶ however, it was also a response to the rise of the so-called¶ social movements (including feminism, gay and lesbian politics,¶ and ethnic struggles) and the subsequent extension of politics into¶ "lifestyle" issues such as health, food, sexuality and the body.23¶ More generally, as social heterogeneity and cross-cutting axes¶ become increasingly visible, social theorists have been forced to¶ take questions of identity and subjectivity more seriously. Indeed,¶ it is noticeable that identity has become a "keyword" for the social¶ sciences, and that a more capacious Gramscian conception of ideology¶ is now commonplace.e'¶ There have, of course, been influential critiques of Hall's work.¶ Perhaps best known is the debate that took place in New Left¶ Review during the 1980s. In this debate Hall was accused of overstating¶ support for the New Right and, in doing so, indulging in a¶ "apparent ideological celebration of Thatcherism." The alternative¶ account emphasized the political-economic under-pinnings of¶ Thatcherism, arguing that it was primarily a state strategy to reestablish¶ the conditions for sustained capitalist accumulation.c¶ More recently, this argument has been further developed using¶ concepts from the neo-Marxist Regulation school. In this later formulation,¶ neo-liberalism is understood as a mode of social regulation--¶ one possible form of a "Schumpterian workfare state."26¶ Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, in contrast, argue that rather than¶ representing a new mode of social regulation, neo-liberalism¶ should be seen as a regulatory vacuum and the outbreak of "jungle¶ law."27¶ The work of Jane Jenson is also influenced by Regulation¶ theory.28However, unlike her counterparts discussed above, the¶ question of identity formation is central to her analysis. Jenson is¶ concerned to explore the ''universe of political discourse" within¶ which identities are socially constructed. Her emphasis is on political¶ agency: how it is that groups of people mobilize around particular¶ collective identities in order to represent their interests and¶ intervene in the process of restructuring. Her primary emphasis is¶ on oppositional identities, in particular those of social movements,¶ rather than those constituted through official institutions and narratives.¶ In the context of the argument made in this paper, the¶ strength of Jenson's work is that she alerts us to the idea that the¶ universe of political discourse is not monopolized by hegemonic¶ groups.¶ Innovative accounts of neo-liberalism and welfare state restructuring¶ emerge out of these neo-Gramscian literatures, most notably¶ in the work of socialist-feminist analysts. Janine Brodie, for example,¶ argues that the contemporary shift in governing practices is "a¶ historic alteration in state form which enacts simultaneous changes¶ in cultural assumptions, political identities and the very terrain of¶ political struggle."29 Her work interrogates new discourses of¶ social welfare, marks shifts in understandings of citizenship, and¶ explores how these articulate with new understandings of gender¶ relations. Moreover, she stresses that social movements are part of¶ this complex matrix of discursive construction and reconstruction.¶ w Likewise, in an analysis of the "politics of post-welfare state¶ arrangements" in the Ministry of Health and Social Services in¶ Quebec, Dominique Masson explicates the role of women's organizations¶ in shaping new state forms, emphasizing that restructuring¶ is a contested process and "a complex, messy and contingent¶ historical phenomena."31¶ These analyses show that new political configurations are more¶ multi-vocal than we might previously have understood. Most¶ immediately, we are alerted to the possibility that there are different¶ configurations of neo-liberalism, and that close inspection of¶ particular neo-liberal political projects is more likely to reveal a¶ complex and hybrid political imaginary, rather than the straightforward¶ implementation of a unified and coherent philosophy.¶ Moreover, in making visible the claims of those all too often portrayed¶ as the ''victims'' of welfare state restructuring, these studies¶ emphasize that new welfare state arrangements emerge out of¶ political struggle, rather than being imposed in a top down manner.¶ Finally, and not unrelatedly, we are forced to explore the¶ notion that power is productive, and that the articulations between¶ hegemonic and oppositional claims give rise to new political subjectivities¶ and social identities which then enter into the "discourse¶ of restructuring."32¶ Neo-Iiberalism as Govemmentality As will be apparent from¶ the discussion above, it is a short step from ideology to discourse,¶ and thus to the third reading of neo-liberalism to feature in this¶ paper. However, this step requires us to move from Gramsci to¶ Foucault, and from neo-Marxism to post-structuralism. In poststructuralist¶ literatures, discourse is understood not simply as a¶ form of rhetoric disseminated by hegemonic economic and political¶ groups, nor as the framework within which people represent¶ their lived experience, but rather as a system of meaning that constitutes¶ institutions, practices and identities in contradictory and¶ disjunctive ways.v Indeed, Hall himself has taken this step with a¶ self-identified shift from a "base-superstructure ideology model"¶ to a "discursive model."34¶ The most influential post-structuralist theorization of neo-liberalism¶ is that associated with the neo-Foucauldian literature on¶ governmentality.a> This literature makes a useful distinction¶ between government and governance, and argues that while neoliberalism¶ may mean less government, it does not follow that there¶ is less governance. While on one hand neo-liberalism problematizes¶ the state and is concerned to specify its limits through the¶ invocation of individual choice, on the other hand it involves¶ forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals¶ to conform to the norms of the market. Elsewhere I have used¶ the term "market governance" to capture this point.36¶ The governmentality literature has inspired innovative analyses¶ of welfare state restructuring which show that social policy reform¶ is linked to a new specification of the object of governance. The¶ conception of a national community of citizens, made up of male¶ breadwinners and female domestic workers, has been usurped by¶ a new understanding in which not only are firms to be¶ entrepreneurial, enterprising and innovative, but so too are political¶ subjects. Neo-liberal strategies of rule, found in diverse realms¶ including workplaces, educational institutions and health and welfare¶ agencies, encourage people to see themselves as individualized¶ and active subjects responsible for enhancing their own well¶ being. This conception of the "active society" can also be linked¶ to a particular politics of self in which we are all encouraged to¶ ''work on ourselves" in a range of domains, including the "counter¶ cultural movements" outside the purview of traditional conceptions¶ of the political.I?¶ Nikolas Rose elucidates the process by which this new formula¶ of rule has usurped that of the welfare state.38He argues that it¶ was the linking of the critiques of the welfare state (from both¶ sides of the political spectrum) to the political technologies associated¶ with marketization, that provided the basis for "advanced¶ liberal" rule. Welfare agencies are now to be governed, not directly¶ from above, but through technologies such as budget disciplines,¶ accountancy and audit. In association with this "degovernmentalization"¶ of the welfare state, competition and consumer¶ demand have supplanted the norms of "public service."¶ Correspondingly, the citizen is re-specified as an active agent both¶ able and obliged to exercise autonomous choices. In his research¶ on unemployment, William Walters has looked at how this new¶ understanding forms the basis for active labour market policies,¶ and is associated with the "desocialization" of unemployment and¶ poverty.s?¶ The political implications of these analyses are perhaps more¶ subtle than those discussed previously. As O'Malley, Weir and¶ Shearing explain, ''the broad aim of the approach is to generate a¶ 'post-social politics' that provides a successor to socialism, but¶ which nonetheless is more than a simple condemnation of neo-liberal¶ and neo-conservative thinking."40¶ At the same time, those¶ working within this tradition are clear that they wish to avoid generating¶ a specific political programme. Rather they aspire to "fragment¶ the present;" "the received fixedness and inevitability of the¶ present is destabilized, shown as just sufficiently fragile as to let in¶ a little glimpse of freedom-as a practice of difference-through¶ its fractures."41 This politics stresses the complexity, ambiguity and¶ the contingency of contemporary political formations to maximize¶ possibilities for critical responses and interventions.¶ As yet, however, the governmentality literature has not paid a¶ great deal of attention to the politics surrounding specific programmes¶ and policies.P This is particularly the case vis-a-vis theorizations¶ of neo-liberalism in that the emphasis has been on broad¶ governmental themes rather than specific neo-liberal projects. This¶ programmatic orientation is reflected in the distinction made by¶ Nikolas Rose between "advanced liberalism" as a governmentality¶ and "neo-liberalism" as a political ideology.v Yet it is obvious that¶ without analyses of the "messy actualities" of particular neo-liberal¶ projects, those working within this analytic run the risk of precisely¶ the problem they wish to avoid-that of producing generalized¶ accounts of historical epochs. Indeed, this is precisely the criticism¶ made of this literature by Boris Frankel, who argues that advanced¶ liberalism is a totalizing concept, despite attempts to distance the¶ governmentality literature from other grand theories.s-¶ Moreover, in the few instances where the emphasis has been on¶ neo-liberal projects, the analysis has tended to focus on official¶ discourses, as read through government policy documents. As Pat¶ O'Malley explains, this means that this body of work privileges¶ official discourses, with the result that it is difficult to recognize¶ the imbrication of resistance and rule.45 My point is that despite its¶ origins in Foucauldian formulations, remarkably few of these¶ analyses draw from the discourses of oppositional groups as well¶ as those of hegemonic groups.s« It is in this context that I argue for¶ a formulation that draws on the insights of both the neo-Marxist¶ and socialist-feminist analyses discussed in the second section of¶ the paper, and the governmentality literature examined herein.¶ Theorizing the "New Zealand Experiment" The ''New Zealand¶ experiment" is a particularly challenging case through which to¶ work my argument. International attention has focused on this¶ country not only because of the depth and rapidity of the reforms¶ instituted by successive governments since 1984, but also because¶ this case appears to involve the direct application of a clearly¶ delineated theoretical model. For example, John Gray, Professor¶ of Politics at Oxford University, recently observed:¶ The neo-liberal experiment in New Zealand is the most ambitious¶ attempt at constructing the free market as a social institution to be¶ implemented anywhere this century. It is a clearer case ofthe costs and¶ limits of reinventing the free market than the Thatcherite experiment¶ in Britain. 47¶ While these comments may be somewhat exaggerated, even¶ more nuanced commentators agree the "New Zealand experiment"¶ was an early and extreme example of the now widespread¶ transition from social democracy to neo-liberalism in welfare state¶ societies."¶ In most discussions of the "New Zealand experiment," neo-liberalism¶ is understood as a coherent, top-down, state-initiated policy¶ agenda based on a unified political philosophy. Indeed there is¶ such a tight identification between neo-liberalism and the state¶ that in the most recent edited collection on the political economy¶ of New Zealand they are referenced together.s? There is also a¶ widespread assumption that this policy agenda has "programmatic¶ coherence'w despite the diversity of political perspectives and¶ ideological standpoints from which concepts such as devolution,¶ community and empowerment are disseminated. Even when the¶ resonance between hegemonic and oppositional claims is¶ acknowledged, the explanation tends to be in terms of "their" cooption¶ of "our" language. One consequence of this formulation is¶ that many of those who would contest this policy agenda unwittingly¶ reinforce the coherence ofneo-liberalism.¶ It is the "programmatic coherence" of neo-liberalism that this¶ paper seeks to challenge. My claim is that in constructing neo-liberalism¶ as a monolithic apparatus that is completely knowable¶ and in full control of the "New Right," such analyses inadvertently¶ reconstruct its hegemony. In this regard I am persuaded by¶ Wendy Brown's argument that many well-intentioned contemporary¶ political projects and theoretical postures inadvertently¶ redraw the very configurations and effects of power they seek to¶ vanquish.>! Both neo-Marxist and socialist-feminist literatures on¶ the "politics of restructuring" and the post-structuralist literatures¶ on governmentality open up possibilities to theorize the "New¶ Zealand experiment" in ways that emphasize its historically contingent¶ and internally contradictory aspects, rather than its coherence.¶ In this regard, it will be apparent that I take seriously the¶ post-structuralist admonition to recognize the consequences of¶ our theories, and to make visible "contested representations within¶ what are putatively singular or common cultures."52¶ What then might we see if we were to take such an approach?¶ Most immediately, the analysis needs to be grounded in a detailed¶ investigation of the case in order to make visible the messy actualities¶ of new forms of governance; the contradictions, complexities¶ and inconsistencies that inevitably characterize neo-liberal¶ political projects, including the "New Zealand experiment."¶ Moreover, whereas a more orthodox account might analyse these¶ differences as simply permutations on a more general themestressing,¶ for example, the similarities between Rogernomics and¶ Thatcherism-an approach grounded in the literatures explored¶ herein would stress the specificity of these political projects.v¶ Such an approach understands that different formulations of neoliberalism¶ emerge out of a multiplicity of political forces always¶ in competition with one another, producing unintended outcomes¶ and unexpected alignments. Moreover, the emergence of new¶ political projects is never a complete rupture with what has gone¶ before, but rather is part of an ongoing process involving the recomposition¶ of political rationalities, programmes and identities.¶ In terms of substantive research projects, the differing strands of¶ thought that come together under the label of neo-liberalism in¶ New Zealand can be identified and explored. Reviving the distinction¶ between neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism, and then identifying¶ variants within each of these formulations, may be a critical¶ first step.>' In this regard, the work of Bruce Jesson et aZ. and Anne¶ Else is notable, and can be used to inform contemporary concerns.¶ s' Both were concerned to emphasize two different strands of¶ "new right ideology"-libertarianism and authoritarianism-and¶ argued the fourth Labour government was dominated by libertarians.¶ This argument could be extended. For example, whereas Hall¶ argued that Thatcherism managed to articulate neo-liberalism with¶ neo-conservatism, it could be argued that the achievement of the¶ fourth Labour government was that it was able to articulate a libertarian¶ version of neo-liberalism with social democratic aspirations.¶ 56This point also alerts us to the importance of exploring the¶ contradictions between social justice and economic agendas during¶ the 1980s. This is an often noted, but rarely investigated, aspect of¶ existing commentaries on the "New Zealand experiment."¶ In contrast, the policies and programmes of the National government¶ of the 1990s involved an articulation between a more¶ authoritarian version of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, and¶ was thus a more recognizable "New Right" configuration. Even¶ during the 1990s, however, there were diverse and sometimes contradictory¶ formulations. There were, for example, clear tensions¶ between "market governance" in the economic realm premised on¶ individualistic and entrepreneurial economic subjects who could¶ be "governed from a distance," and the increased visibility of the¶ state in the area of social policy. These tensions were most notable¶ in the 1998 proposal to develop a "Code of Social and Family¶ Responsibility." This Code was premised on the assumption that¶ direct monitoring of New Zealand families could be used to foster¶ self-reliant and enterprising neo-libera1 subjects. Rather than conflating¶ these tensions under broad claims about the "New Right,"¶ the contradictions within and between these political rationales¶ can be made explicit and explored.t"¶ It follows that greater attention should be paid to the contestations¶ within and between hegemonic (neo-liberal?) groups.¶ Already there is work that alerts us to the existence of such tensions;¶ for example the debates within the Labour party,58 or the¶ well-publicized clashes between the Employers Federation and¶ the Manufacturers Federation. Closer attention to the specificities¶ of neo-liberalism would also encourage "de-centered" approaches¶ to the state, with an emphasis on the detail of the restructuring of¶ different government departments and state agencies. In this¶ regard, Geoff Fougere's 1997 research on the health sector in New¶ Zealand is indicative. 59His institutionalist analysis shows that the¶ new "hybrid" health system is less the result of design from above¶ than "skilful improvisation" from below. He identifies the "confusion"¶ of principles and forms of organization in this sector, and¶ argues that rather than this being a transitional moment (from one¶ pure form to another), the new health apparatus may well be more¶ permanent than is commonly assumed.¶ Inevitably such projects multiply the social locations from¶ which new formulations emerge. Social movements become visible¶ in these analyses, not simply as victims, but as active agents¶ in the process of political-economic change. At the same time, it¶ needs to be recognized that political "resistance" is figured by¶ and within, rather than being external to, the regimes of power it¶ contests.s'' Again, signposts exist for such work. Denese Henare¶ and Brenda Tahi, for example, emphasize that in New Zealand¶ public sector restructuring has been significantly shaped by¶ attempts to institutionalize bi-culturalism.st As Mason Durie¶ observes:¶ Positive Maori development, with its focus on tribal responsibilities¶ for health, education, welfare, economic progress, and greater autonomy,¶ fitted quite comfortably with the free market philosophy of a¶ minimal state, non-government provision of services, economic selfsufficiency¶ and privatization.62¶ This is not to suggest that the discourses of neo-liberalism and¶ tino rangatiratanga can be reduced to each other, nor is it to deny¶ neo-liberal hegemony. However it is to take seriously the idea¶ that new welfare state arrangements emerge out of political struggle,¶ rather than being simply imposed in a top-down manner. In¶ New Zealand demands from Maori for the right to deliver services¶ in culturally appropriate forms constitute a very significant¶ critique of the post-war welfare state. Moreover, as Elizabeth¶ Rata argues, in the last two decades there has been a dialectical¶ interaction between state actors and Maori as both have attempted¶ to reposition themselves in a wider global context. During this¶ process, neo-liberals and some Maori found themselves in unexpected¶ agreement on a key theme: namely, the dangers of continued¶ dependency on the state. 63 In this case, therefore, we see very¶ clearly that the claims of social movements are part of the discursive¶ construction and reconstruction associated with welfare¶ state restructuring.¶ Similarly, while the economic restructuring programme initiated¶ by the fourth Labour government is often seen as detrimental for¶ women, there were also important feminist victories during this¶ period. An active women's council and a feminist party president¶ meant that broader feminist struggles were reflected in both Labour¶ party organization and policy proposals. Once elected, the fourth¶ Labour cabinet was notable for the inclusion of several "stroppy¶ women."64The presence of these women provided the impetus for¶ important initiatives, including the establishment of a Ministry for¶ Women's Affairs. EEO programmes were also advanced, becoming¶ mandatory in the public sector with the passing of the State¶ Sector Act 1988. In her analysis of the EEO initiative, Alex¶ Woodley argues its success could be attributed to a general¶ appreciation of the merits of the case, together with widespread¶ political support from women in parliament, the bureaucracy, com-¶ munity groups and trade unions.e> Homosexual Law Reform and¶ the short-lived Employment Equity Act 66¶ were amongst the other¶ important initiatives. Thus, whereas neo-liberalism is often associated¶ with an anti-feminist backlash (see David,67 for example, on¶ the United Kingdom and the United States), the contrary was the¶ case in New Zealand during the 1980s.¶ Understanding neo-liberalism through these lenses also encourages¶ investigation of the reformulation of identities, not simply as¶ the outcome of rhetoric or political manipulation, but rather as an¶ integral part of the process of restructuring. It would centre the¶ recognition that political power does not just act on political subjects,¶ but constructs them in particular ways.68 This would help us¶ understand the processes by which the subjectivities of New¶ Zealanders have become more closely aligned with the individualistic¶ assumptions that underpin neo-liberalism, and how economic¶ identities have come to be posited as a new basis for political life,¶ usurping those associated with social citizenship. Elsewhere, for¶ example, I have shown that the restructuring of the telecommunications¶ industry was integrally associated with a move away from¶ governmental conceptions of the "public" and the concomitant¶ centring of the "consumer" as the hegemonic political-economic¶ identity. The analysis demonstrated that this change was a consequence¶ of the contestation between dominant and oppositional¶ claims, rather than being simply imposed from above.s?¶ This attention to identity can be extended to consider how new¶ gendered, racialized and classed subjectivities are also emerging¶ out of the articulations between hegemonic and oppositional¶ claims in the "discourse of restructuring."70 It is notable, for¶ example, that the new "consumer-citizen" is de-gendered.?! The¶ concept of the male breadwinner has also been eroded, manifest in¶ a more gender-neutral model of the citizen worker.Z- Government¶ agencies and documents now recognize diverse family forms,¶ rather than insisting on a culturally specific nuclear model of the¶ nuclear family, and more often use the gender-neutral term "parents,"¶ rather than the gender specific terms "mothers" and¶ "fathers." Indeed, one of the striking aspects of the proposed Code¶ of Social and Family Responsibility was that despite the emphasis¶ on the family as a self-supporting site of social well-being, it¶ explicitly referred to mothers only when discussing pregnancy and¶ child bearing, and exhorted fathers to assume more responsibility¶ for childcare and family life.¶ Of course, it is easy to be cynical about these changes.¶ Certainly, when second wave feminists demanded the rights to¶ economic independence and labour force participation for women¶ on the same terms as men, they did not anticipate increasing numbers¶ of men being employed in jobs and under terms and conditions¶ once associated only with women.ts Moreover, women who¶ opt for motherhood now find their labour devalued in a context¶ where paid work appears to be all,74 whereas those who choose¶ not to have children contend with the legacy of earlier formulations¶ and are seen as ''un-natural women." My point is, however,¶ that there is an articulation between feminist claims for gender¶ neutrality premised on the assumption that women have the right¶ to autonomous personhood, and neo-liberal claims for possessive¶ individualism. As O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver remind us, neoliberalism¶ emerged in a period when increasing numbers of¶ women entered into the labour market, and during which liberal¶ feminists have forcefully asserted women's personhood in law and¶ the market.v> The consequence is that neo-liberals are thus more¶ willing to recognize women as individuals in their own right than¶ their post-war political counterparts.¶ Conclusion Most immediately, I am making a claim for a more¶ detailed engagement with contemporary changes in governance,¶ rather than dismissing them as the prerogative of the "New Right."¶ Such investigations may reveal that neo-liberalism is a more tenuous¶ phenomenon than is commonly assumed. By focusing attention¶ on the historically specific and internally contradictory¶ aspects of neo-liberalism, and the shaping of specific neo-liberal¶ projects by articulations between both hegemonic and non-hegemonic¶ groups, it will become apparent that neo-liberalism, like the¶ welfare state, is "more an ethos or an ethical ideal, than a set of¶ completed or established institutions."76 The emergence of new¶ forms of political power does not simply involve the imposition of¶ a new understanding on top of the old. The transformation of a¶ polity involves the complex linking of various domains of practice,¶ is ongoingly contested, and the result is not a foregone conclusion.¶ Consequently, contemporary forms of rule are inevitably¶ composite, plural and multi-form.¶ Thus, while fully recognizing the distinctiveness of the contemporary¶ forms of political-economic life, it will become possible to¶ move past the either/or debates that currently structure political¶ life. If neo-liberalism cannot be reduced to a single set of philosophical¶ principles or a unified political ideology, nor is necessarily¶ linked to a particular political apparatus, this will encourage us¶ to think about different versions of neo-liberalism, and allow¶ exploration of the possibilities that might enhance social wellbeing.¶ As O'Malley, Weir and Shearing explain:¶ Not only does (the governmentality literature) provide a theoretical¶ elaboration which potentially opens everyday and institutional programmes¶ and practices for critical and tactical thinking, it also provides¶ a considerable array of empirical work in terms of which interventions¶ can be examined and thought out.??¶ Obviously these claims challenge many orthodoxies. Yet without¶ such an engagement, we restrict our potential to imagine¶ political alternatives. Only by theorizing neo-liberalism as a¶ multi-vocal and contradictory phenomenon can we make visible¶ the contestations and struggles that we are currently engaged in.¶ Moreover, the alternatives, premised on monolithic conceptions¶ of the "New Right," are both politically disempowering and intellectually unsatisfying. As academics, we need to pay careful attention to the reasons why the so-called "rhetoric" of programmers resonates, parodies and complicates our analyses, if only because in acknowledging the complexity of neo-liberalism we stand a better chance of identifying possibilities to advance social justice aims in a new context.

#### Demanding a “competitive policy option” *entrenches neoliberalism* and ensures *serial policy failure*

Gunder et al., Aukland University senior planning lecturer, 2009 (Michael, Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning pgs 111-2, ldg)

The hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debates and draws on appropriate policies of desired success, such as the needs of bohemians, knowledge clusters, or talented knowledge workers, as to what constitutes their desired enjoyment (cobblestones, chrome and cappuccinos at sidewalk cafes) and what is therefore lacking in local competitiveness. In tum, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of economic, spatial planning, or other, remedy. Such an argument is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness (for surely they are one and the same) is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Lack and its resolution are generally presented as technical, rather than political issues. Consequently, technocrats in partnership with their "˜dominant stakeholders` can ensure the impression of rationally seeking to produce happiness for the many whilst, of course, achieving their stakeholders' specific interests (Gunder and Hillier 2007a, 469). The current "˜post-democratic` milieu facilitates the above through avoidance of critical policy debate challenging favored orthodox positions and policy approaches. Consideration of policy deficiencies, or alternative solutions, are eradicated from political debate so that while "˜token institutions of liberal democracy' are retained conflicting positions and arguments are negated (Stavrakakis 2003, 59). Consequently, "˜the safe names in the field who feed the policy orthodoxy are repeatedly used or their work drawn upon. by different stakeholders. while more critical voices are silenced by their inability to shape policy debates' (Boland 2007, 1032). The economic development or spatial planning policy analyst thus continues to partition reality ideologically by deploying only the orthodox "˜successful' or "˜best practice' economic development or spatial planning responses. This further maintains the dominant, or hegemonic, status quo while providing "˜a cover and shield against critical thought by acting in the manner of a "buffer" isolating the political held Rom any research that is independent and radical in its conception as in its implications for public policy' (Wacquant 2004, 99). At the same time, adoption of the hegemonic orthodoxy tends to generate similar policy responses for every competing local area or city-region. largely resulting in a zero-sum game (Blair and Kumar 1997).

### Rels

#### Neoliberalism produces the crises they try to solve and prevents effective solutions – makes extinction inevitable

**Mosaddeq, Sussex University IR professor, 2010**

(Nafeez, “Globalizing Insecurity: The Convergence of Interdependent Ecological, Energy, and Economic Crises”, 7-20, <http://yalejournal.org/2010/07/globalizing-insecurity-the-convergence-of-interdependent-ecological-energy-and-economic-crises/>, DOA: 6-29-12)

The logic of ‘growth’ – as currently defined – is driving the depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources at unprecedented, and unsustainable, rates, and thereby accelerating human-interference with the earth’s climate. Both climate change and energy crises are detrimentally impacting our ability to sustain global food production. Water shortages and hotter weather are destroying the viability of agriculture, while predicted fuel shortages are set to undermine agribusiness which is heavily dependent on fossil fuels. The increasing inability to meet consumer demand for food is also linked to the industrial over-exploitation of the soil, as well as a fundamentally flawed international system of food distribution. Finally, the world economy remains in bad health, generating widening North-South inequalities, and fuelling unsustainable ‘virtual’ growth trajectories in the North. The ‘Washington Consensus’ has proven to be intimately bound up with the destruction of the environment, the exhaustion of the soil, the unsustainable depletion of resources and raw materials, and the unrestrained de-balancing of the Earth’s complexly interdependent ecosystems. If anything, this signifies that we are in era of civilizational transition to a new post-carbon era. Yet what social form we transition to, remains our collective choice. Currently, conventional ‘securitization’ of these global crises results in their conceptualization as “threat-multipliers” of traditional security issues such as “political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens.” By implication, climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.[xlvi] For instance, a U.S. Department of Defence and Department of the Army report, 2008 Army Modernization Strategy, forecasts the future of international conflict up to 2050: “We have entered an era of persistent conflict... a security environment much more ambiguous and unpredictable than that faced during the Cold War... We face a potential return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets.” The report then highlights the danger of “resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies,” particularly due to a projected “youth bulge” in the South, which “will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy.” Climate change will “compound” the destabilization of the South through humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.[xlvii] ‘Securitizing’ global crises, then, leads to strategies of militarization designed to boost an individual state’s resilience to crisis through intensification of control mechanisms. On the other hand, we have strategies of international cooperation to establish new global governance regimes by which states can develop treaties and agreements to encourage mitigating action. Unfortunately, as has become painfully clear in Kyoto and more recently in Copenhagen, while the first set of ‘securitization’ strategies proceeds apace, the second set of cooperative strategies continues to result in dismal failure, with states unable to agree on the scale of the crises concerned, let alone the policies required to address them. In some ways, each of these strategies can be broadly associated with the two predominant approaches to International Relations theory, namely neorealism and neoliberalism. Neorealism understands interstate competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximize its power relative to all other states is simply a reflection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot, of course, is the normalization of political violence in the international system, including practices such as over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy – even though this ultimately amplifies global systemic insecurity. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual benefit is thus seen as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states. The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the first place the complex interdependence or worsening of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a specific exploitative relationship with the natural world, neorealism can only theorize global crises as ‘new issue areas’ appended to existing security agendas.[xlviii] Yet, by the very act of ‘securitizing’ global crises, neorealism renders itself impotent to prevent or mitigate them by addressing their root structural causes. In effect, despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, neorealism’s approach to issues like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame these issues purely as amplifiers of threats. Neorealism thus entirely negates its own theoretical and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the global systemic amplifiers of ‘insecurity’? Although neoliberalism shares neorealism’s assumptions about the centrality of the state as a rational actor in the international system, it differs fundamentally in the notion that gains for one state do not automatically imply losses for another. As such, states are able to form cooperative, interdependent relationships conducive to mutual power gains, which do not necessarily generate tensions or conflict. While neoliberalism therefore encourages international negotiations and global governance mechanisms for the resolution of global crises, it implicitly accepts the contemporary social, political and economic organization of the international system as an unquestionable ‘given’ that cannot be subject to debate or reform. The focus, then, is on developing the most optimal ways of exploiting the natural world to the maximal extent, and neglected is the very role of global political economic structures (such as ridiculously deregulated markets) in both generating global crises and inhibiting effective means for their amelioration. Arguably, neoliberalism has difficulty viewing the natural world in anything other than a rationalist, instrumentalist fashion, legitimizing the over-exploitation of natural resources without limits, and inadvertently subordinating ecological, energy, food and human security to the competitive pressures of private sector profit-maximization.[xlix] Both theoretical approaches focus on trying to understand different aspects of inter-state behaviour – conflictual and cooperative respectively – but each lacks the capacity to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the natural world as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. In doing so, they are unable to acknowledge the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalizing insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security. Indeed, by reducing this destructive state behaviour to a function of instrumental reason, both approaches rationalize the deeply irrational collective human actions that are destroying the very conditions of our existence. For our civilization to begin tackling these crises effectively, we need to fundamentally re-orient our understanding of the conditions and subjects of security, based on a new perspective which re-integrates human life as interdependent with, and inextricably embedded in, its natural environment.[l] This requires a holistic vision of human and ecological security, which recognizes that significant global structural policy reforms are the only means to protect human life, national survival, and civilizational continuity into the 21st century. That is not to belittle the urgent task of adaptation, but to recognize that we will save more lives and treasure if we act preventively by re-thinking the efficacy of our current way of life.

#### Using the state to integrate economies is the key to neoliberal control

**Phillips, Sheffield political economy professor, 2005**

(Nicola, “U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic Governance in the Americas”, Latin American Politics and Society, 47.4, December, Wiley)

The process of hemispheric integration represents a key dimension of the neoliberal project, both in the Americas and in the wider global political economy. It represents a device by which this global project is further embedded in the region and the region is further embedded in the globalizing world economy, reflecting “the triumph of economic lib- eralism, of faith in export-led growth and of belief in the centrality of the private sector to development processes” (Payne 1996, 106). Hemi- spheric regionalism thus represents a specific strategy on the part of its primary agents-various governments and business interests-to “lock in” a political economy and a mode of social organization that are ide- ologically and strategically hospitable to the rules of the neoliberal game. Of these agents, the U.S. government has been the principal driv- ing force, and the exercise of its hegemonic power since the early 1970s has been molded systematically to the purpose of disseminating the twin values of neoliberalism and democracy. The hemispheric project thus constitutes not only an attempt further to reinforce the parameters of a neoliberal (and democratic) political economy in the Americas, but also to consolidate the foundations of U.S. hegemony itself in the global and regional contexts.

#### That means that the state only pursues policies that benefit the neoliberal market

**Paterson et al., Ottawa political science professor, 2012**

(Matthew, “Neoliberal Climate Policy: From market fetishism to the developmental state”, Environmental Politics Volume 21, Issue 2, ebsco, ldg)

Our argument in this article is that the central problem with these analyses lies in the way that they conceive of neoliberalism either purely at the level of ideology, or in terms of at roll-out of financial interests, in other words, they tend to take too seriously the ideological claims made by market fundamentalists about how neoliberal states in practice operate, and thereby tend to over-represent the place of commodification and privatization logics in neoliberal policy. Instead, we argue that a more conceptually nuanced depiction of neoliberal climate policy would acknowledge that, while commodification and greater use of market instruments are indeed salient elements of the contemporary response, they are merely one aspect of it, and have not crowded out (or successfully trumped) other competing logics in the policy process. In particular, neoliberal ideology does not negate the state`s structural role in creating the conditions for stable growth and accumulation. Regarding climate change, this entails broad action to establish new modes of regulation for things like energy and environmental security and using the specific forms that climate policy takes as means to promote new forms of accumulation and sectoral growth. At best, neoliberal ideology provides a contextual backdrop for these policy objectives and can thereby alter the ways that policies manifest under market fundamentalist conditions, but it does not alter them in any basic manner.

#### choosing to engage now allows the state to force neoliberalism on Cuba and Latin America

**Gonzalez, law prof, 3** (Carmen, Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, p. 685, 2003, “Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba”, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987944>, ZBurdette)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external—the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era.410 It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path.

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union.412 Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.415

It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cubansovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418

Cuba is once again at a crossroads—as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.419 The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation.

The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### outweighs the case – it renders populations disposable if they don’t contribute to the market – justifies genocide – causes extinction

**Santos, sociology prof, 3** (Boaventura de Sousa, Professor of Sociology at the School of Economics, University of Coimbra (Portugal) and Distinguished Scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. "Collective Suicide?" March 28, 2003 online http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra‑conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to he incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

### Ag

#### Insulation from neoliberal policies is key to a sustainable model of Cuban agriculture

Gonzalez, 3 – Assistant professor at Seattle University School of Law

(Carmen, “SEASONS OF RESISTANCE: SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN CUBA” p. 729-33, Summer 2003, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=987944##)//HA

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union. Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.

It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cuban sovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture. If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418

#### **Lifting the embargo is a way to pry open the cuban market**

Moreno 3 (Jenalia, Houston Chronicle (TX), "Capitalism Gains a Foothold in Cuba," EBSCO)

But from the moment visitors arrive at the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, signs abound that capitalism has been seeping into Cuba. For the past five years, much of that influx has been generated courtesy of U.S. corporations taking advantage of a relaxation of the embargo and of Cuba's grudging move away from a purely socialist society. At the Havana airport, officials call out in Spanish, urging passengers to hurry and board their Continental Airlines flight to Miami. The Continental flights are charters operated by other companies, but the planes belong to the Houston-based airline, and the pilots and flight attendants work for Continental. Among other signs of American markets creeping onto the island are that farmers in the United States can now sell their products to Cuba. Stop at a Havana shopping center, and it's easy to find an office of American money-wiring company Western Union. In the late 1990s, the U.S. Treasury Department granted the company a license to provide wiring services from the United States to Cuba. Once taboo words, capitalism and consumerism are quickly taking hold here. That's not to say that visitors will see the Golden Arches or Starbucks in Cuba. But foreign-owned companies are entering partnerships with the Cuban government to bring more goods and services to the nation. And Cubans are trying, legally and illegally, to start their own small businesses. Foreign companies such as Belgium-based DHL deliver packages on the island. Car dealerships sell late-model imports. Coca-Cola made in Mexico is mixed with Cuban rum in Cuba Libre cocktails. Italian clothing retailer Benetton Group operates shops in Havana. But while capitalism has an obvious foothold, heavy-handed regulations and the lack of capital and spending power strictly limit the role of private employers in the economy. The rules allow restaurants and other service-industry businesses to operate, but they strictly limit their potential for growth.

#### That allows corporations to enclose the agricultural market

Regional Business News 2 ("U.S. Could Seize Much of Cuba's Rice Market by Lifting Embargo, Expert Says By: Kevin Freking, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock, AR), Feb 12, 2002," EBSCO)

Feb. 12--WASHINGTON--If the embargo on Cuba was lifted today, the United States could capture about half of the island's rice market immediately, with opportunities to expand on that in future years, a professor at the University of Arkansas said. Rice represents about 18 percent of the calories consumed in Cuba, and the country now fills most of that demand with imports from Southeast Asia, said Eric Wailes, head of the university's Global Rice Marketing and Policy Research Program. He agrees with Arkansas lawmakers who say ending the embargo would be beneficial to the state's farmers. "It would be very helpful. There is no doubt about that," he said. "We're losing competitively to Thailand and Vietnam and China, so a market as close as Cuba is sort of a gift at our doorstep if we could open it up." It's not easy to estimate just how great a gift it would be. Cuba's economy has been devastated, so there is a question about how much rice it could afford to buy from the United States. There is also the possibility Cuba will become more self-sufficient in future years. Its rice yields were above the world average until the Soviet Union quit subsidizing many aspects of production, such as the cost of fertilizer. Arkansas' Sen. Blanche Lincoln said a couple of weeks ago that the state lost more than half its rice-export market when the embargo was imposed in 1962. That assessment was too high, Wailes said; Cuba accounted for about a quarter of the state's rice exports before the embargo was enacted.

#### That promotes excessive profit maximization in the pursuit of growth.

**Brown, Berkeley political theory professor, 2004**

(Wendy, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy”, Theory and Event Volume 7, Number 1, 2003, project muse)

1) The political sphere, along with every other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted to an economic rationality, or put the other way around, not only is the human being configured exhaustively as homo oeconomicus, all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality. While this entails submitting every action and policy to considerations of profitability, equally important is the production of all human and institutional action as rational entrepreneurial action, conducted according to a calculus of utility, benefit, or satisfaction against a micro-economic grid of scarcity, supply and demand, and moral value-neutrality. Neo-liberalism does not simply assume that all aspects of social, cultural and political life can be reduced to such a calculus, rather it develops institutional practices and rewards for enacting this vision. That is, through discourse and policy promulgating its criteria, neo-liberalism produces rational actors and imposes market rationale for decision-making in all spheres. Importantly then, neo-liberalism involves a normative rather than ontological claim about the pervasiveness of economic rationality and advocates the institution building, policies, and discourse development appropriate to such a claim. Neo-liberalism is a constructivist project: it does not presume the ontological givenness of a thoroughgoing economic rationality for all domains of society but rather takes as its task the development, dissemination, and institutionalization of such a rationality. This point is further developed in (2) below. 2) In contrast with the notorious laissez faire and human propensity to "truck and barter" of classical economic liberalism, neo-liberalism does not conceive either the market itself or rational economic behavior as purely natural. Both are constructed -- organized by law and political institutions, and requiring political intervention and orchestration. Far from flourishing when left alone, the economy must be directed, buttressed, and protected by law and policy as well as by the dissemination of social norms designed to facilitate competition, free trade, and rational economic action on the part of every member and institution of society. In Lemke's account, "In the Ordo-liberal scheme, the market does not amount to a natural economic reality, with intrinsic laws that the art of government must bear in mind and respect; instead, the market can be constituted and kept alive only by dint of political interventions . . . competition, too, is not a natural fact . . . this fundamental economic mechanism can function only if support is forthcoming to bolster a series of conditions, and adherence to the latter must consistently be guaranteed by legal measures" (193). The neo-liberal formulation of the state and especially specific legal arrangements and decisions as the pre- and ongoing condition of the market does not mean that the market is controlled by the state but precisely the opposite, that the market is the organizing and regulative principle of the state and society and this along four different lines: a)The state openly responds to needs of the market, whether through monetary and fiscal policy, immigration policy, the treatment of criminals, or the structure of public education. In so doing, the state is no longer encumbered by the danger of incurring the legitimation deficits predicted by 1970s social theorists and political economists such as Nicos Poulantzas, Jurgen Habermas, or James O'Connor.6 Rather, neo-liberal rationality extended to the state itself indexes state success according to its ability to sustain and foster the market and ties state legitimacy to such success. This is a new form of legitimation, one that "founds a state" according to Lemke, and contrasts with the Hegelian and French revolutionary notion of the constitutional state as the emergent universal representative of the people. As Lemke describes Foucault's account of Ordo-liberal thinking, "economic liberty produces the legitimacy for a form of sovereignty limited to guaranteeing economic activity . . . .a state that was no longer defined in terms of an historical mission but legitimated itself with reference to economic growth" (196). b)The state itself is enfolded and animated by market rationality, not simply profitability, but a generalized calculation of cost and benefit becomes the measure of all state practices. Political discourse on all matters is framed in entrepreneurial terms; the state must not simply concern itself with the market but think and behave like a market actor across all of its functions, including law.7 c)Putting (a) and (b) together, the health and growth of the economy is the basis of state legitimacy both because the state is forthrightly responsible for the health of the economy and because of the economic rationality to which state practices have been submitted. Thus, "It's the economy, stupid" becomes more than a campaign principle; rather, it expresses the legitimacy principle of the state and the basis for state action -- from Constitutional adjudication and campaign finance reform to welfare policy to foreign policy, including warfare and the organization of "homeland security."

## Case

# 1NR

## Neolib

### A2 sustainable

#### 2. Try or die-only way to create a system not centered on profit.

**Sachs et al., Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, 2012**

(Wolfgang, “Critique of the Green Economy Toward Social and Environmental Equity”, <http://boell.org/downloads/Critique_of_the_Green_Economy.pdf>, DOA: 6-27-12, ldg)

In all the old industrial countries the times of high economic growth are past. Experts now argue over whether we should expect a slight rise in economic output year on year or zero growth punctuated by upswings and downswings. Yet that takes no account of the green transformation of society and the economy. A strategy of eco-efficiency (“better”), environmental sustainability (“different”) and self-restraint (“less”) has fewer prospects of growth. In a post-growth society the renewable sectors of the economy will need to grow while the fossil ones shrink, but on balance it must be assumed that in the long term growth rates will be negative. How will a non-growing economy work, if everyone has a lower income than before? To this key question, which will define the next few decades, there are broadly speaking two answers – a reactionary one and a progressive one. The reactionary answer involves enduring a period of loss of growth accompanied by increasing inequality, social exclusion and impoverishment. The progressive one sees us investing in a new model of wealth that ensures that everyone has enough, because it is based on a different equilibrium between the economy and society. The progressive answer does not just fall from the sky; we must prepare for it over the forthcoming years and decades. Strengthening society as against the economy needs new types of infrastructure for different ways of thinking. The commons are a fundamental feature of our present reality. People can only survive and thrive if they have access to nature, to family and friends, and to language and culture. While this may seem obvious, it is hard to find a public and political language in which to talk about the commons. If we speak of the economy, the concepts of the market and the state dominate everything else. If we speak of politics, what comes to mind is the polarization of right and left. Hardly anyone mentions the commons – as though nothing of significance exists outside the market and the state. These two concepts are like two communicating tubes: a lot of market on one side and not much state on the other; not much market on one side and a lot of state on the other. Yet historians and anthropologists have long been at pains to point out that exchanging goods via the market or via the state are only two ways in which goods can be distributed – there is a third way: exchange in the community. The first way is governed by the principle of competition and the second by the principle of planning, while in the third the emphasis is on mutuality. In any society the three distributive principles usually mingle, but over the last two centuries something new has happened: the principle of mutuality has steadily lost ground. Since Adam Smith the relationship between the market and the state, between competition and planning, has become the main dispute, while the principle of mutuality has become the big loser. Social groups such as families, relatives, neighborhoods, networks of friends, cooperatives and similar economic forms have been sucked into a vortex of decline from which by turns the market and the state have emerged victorious. In a post-growth society this development must be reversed. Or rather: it must move forwards. The commons are another source of wealth in addition to the market and the state. They form the basis of social communities, especially at four levels: Firstly, at the natural level all humans depend on water, forests, soil, fishing grounds, species diversity, countryside, air and the atmosphere and on the life processes embedded in them. As biological beings they have a right to natural assets, regardless of and with precedence over any private ownership of natural stocks. Secondly, at the social level places such as squares, parks, courtyards and public gardens, as well as post-work leisure, holidays and free time, are essential if social networks are to develop. Thirdly, as far as the cultural level is concerned, it is obvious that language, memory, customs and knowledge are basic to the creation of any material or non-material product. As cultural beings, the spirits and fates of every person ultimately rely on the achievements of others. And finally, fourthly, at the digital level: production and exchange on the Internet work best if access to stored data is not impeded. For free navigation in the virtual world it is important that neither software codes nor the wealth of uploaded documents, sounds and pictures are locked away by excessive property claims. Restoring the strength of the commons requires a different perspective on the economy. What actually is property? And what legitimates the ownership of property? What sounds like a philosophical discussion has practical consequences. If the concept of property does not discriminate clearly between possession and use there is little hope either for the shepherd who lets his sheep graze here one day and there the next, or for the Internet surfer who downloads articles and pictures. And what actually is competition? If competition is understood as “costriving” (and the German word for competition, “Konkurrenz,” has the same Latin root as the English “concur”) rather than as “survival of the fittest,” then small traders and software specialists can breathe again. And what does creating value actually mean? If it means only monetary value created by selling goods and services, then work in the home, neighborhood services, community organizations and peer groups are left out in the cold. And – the most fundamental question of all – what actually is money? If we make no distinction between money as a means of exchange and credit and money as a means of enrichment and speculation, the whole economy is listing dangerously – in nautical terms it is a disaster waiting to happen. Looking at the economy from a different angle reveals important aspects that could be relevant to a no-growth economy. Alongside the formal economy there is a relational economy that is concerned not with material things but with relationships between people. The ambit of the relational economy is wide and can range from traditional associations such as sports clubs and church communities, together with businesses of the classical type such as shops and repair services, to post-modern manifestations such as car-sharing schemes and community solar energy projects. Different forms of commitment can arise: friendships, self-help groups and neighborhood services as well as welfare organizations, local businesses and Internet services. Forms of the relational economy can be found in different sectors: relating to food, the care of the sick and elderly, service provision and everyday needs, and in sports and entertainment. At the core is an economy that is built on social relationships, a “care economy.” It cares for children, young people, the sick and the elderly. It brings together parents, educators and carers of all types. Of course it also demonstrates the difficulties that a relational economy has to contend with: care work, family relationships, local communities and private organizations will need to be financially and structurally reorganized. This reorganization must also extend to relationships between the genders if the inherited gender-based division of labor that is predicated on gender hierarchy is not to become even more firmly entrenched. The “care economy,” and with it the whole concept of the relational economy, will be derailed if men and women do not participate equally. Caring must undergo a political and social revaluation. In the process, paid and unpaid work must be redistributed – not just between the genders, but primarily so. Moreover, the relational economy appeals to different motives and norms than the market and the state. Competition and achievement, routine and loyalty certainly occur and can be a component of the social commons, but they can never replace voluntary action and selforganization, cooperation and enterprise. Whether in the development of Wikipedia or of urban community gardens or in the running of old people’s clubs and nursery schools – the virtue of cooperation is writ large. Cooperation, with all the attendant difficulties, is held in higher regard than competition, shared curiosity is valued more than hoarding egotism. Things are more successful if they are done with passion, commitment and a sense of responsibility – this is an old lesson that classical business administration has been slow to learn. How can an economy function without growing? This is a big question that cannot be answered without considering the hidden dimensions of wealth – and in particular of the care economy. One of these dimensions is the social commons. Although private wealth is the most frequently highlighted aspect of wealth, all the variants of community wealth are just as important. Moreover, they harbor the opportunity of creating forms of a “distributed economy” based on the model of distributed energy production – in other words, forms of local production that are linked, globally if necessary, via the Internet. Above all, though, it has become possible to imagine a form of wealth with less money. Because in the social commons services are not provided for monetary reasons, but out of a sense of community spirit, interest or solidarity, needs can be met with a lesser investment of money. For example, just as Wikipedia would be unaffordable if all the authors and editors had to be paid a fee, older people in a housing project provide caring services for each other that could never be paid for from public care budgets. The reinvention of the commons is therefore vital to the creation of an economic order for the 21st century that has been freed from the dictate of growth.

#### 3 Uniqueness is on our side---neoliberalism’s collapsing in the rest of the world---the question is whether the U.S. can coopt the global response to the crisis and extend market hegemony

Stephen Gill 12, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science, York University, Toronto, and a former Distinguished Scholar in International Political Economy of the International Studies Association, 2012, Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, p. 2-4

Indeed, in several parts of the world, this neoliberal governing formula of authoritarianism and/or controlled electoral democracy/depoliticization is coming under increasing, popular, grassroots pressure. It is not just in Latin America that this is happening, where, in Venezuela and Bolivia, ‘twenty-first-century’ socialism has produced a substantial shift towards a new political order, consolidating progressive, more democratic constitutional forms as well as new regional economic and security alliances outside US control. In early 2011 a wave of Arab revolt, originating in Tunisia, spread throughout the Middle East. It encompassed not only the epicentre of Arab civilization, in Egypt, but also moved quickly to Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain. It was met initially with repression in some contexts, particularly brutal in Libya, provoking civil war and panic in the oil markets. In Tunisia and Egypt, peaceful protests – with protesters, apparently, behaving en masse as a form of revolutionary collective leadership – quickly forced the resignation of their long-standing military dictators. Demands were made for a new political order, with more democracy, redistribution and meaningful rights. The protests were motivated by a variety of grievances but originated in outrage concerning the way that authoritarian and dictatorial leaders had, particularly since the early 1990s, orchestrated policies directed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of neoliberal restructuring, including privatization, to plunder the state and the economy for themselves and for their business allies – while the majority suffered poverty, mass unemployment, and soaring food prices as well as repression and a denial of basic rights and dignity. This state of affairs was widely perceived as being orchestrated by the strategic interests of the United States and Israel with Arab leaders as its subordinates, despite widespread popular opposition to Israeli policies, particularly in Palestine. The regional uprisings drew on a broad swathe of spontaneous and organized secular forces in ways that put to rest the Orientalist myth that inheres in the ‘clash of civilizations’ hypothesis – specifically, that Muslim masses can be mobilized only through religion (see Chapter 8, by Mustapha Pasha). The uprisings also refute ‘the claim of American-sponsored dictators that they are the great bulwark against a rising tide of “Islamo-fascism” (a word of American coinage) that is sweeping the Arab lands. What are in fact sweeping across the Arab world today are the good old values of the French Revolution’ (Ahmad 2011).1 What these revolutionary changes share is their secular, democratic form and a repudiation of years of imperialism and neoliberal restructuring. In the Arab world they herald, particularly given the novel ways in which they combine spontaneous and organized forces in a mass collective leadership, ‘the autumn of the patriarchs’ (Ahmad 2011). These forms seem to be consistent with an emergent ‘postmodern prince’ (see Chapter 13). By contrast, neoliberal leadership operates from the ‘top down’ to underpin ‘market civilization’ and its governing discourse of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ (Gill 1995a). Such leadership – which operates systematically to favour affluent strata of the population – seeks to stabilize dominant power structures and strategies of rule, albeit with some marginal modifications under crisis conditions in ways that do not fundamentally challenge the dominant modes of accumulation and power. This formula is what we can expect to guide the powerful Egyptian army in the aftermath of President Mubarak’s resignation, taking its political guidance from the United States and Israel. Whether this moment signals not only the probable end of patriarchal leadership but, more acutely, the end of disciplinary neoliberalism in the Arab world is a more open question. Neoliberalism can go with authoritarian, technocratic or, indeed, limited electoral forms of leadership and indirect democracy. Strategic cooperation between Israel, Egypt and the United States guarantees Israeli domination of the region; Egypt offers the Pentagon a crucial military platform and privileged access to the Suez Canal, and so the United States will seek to maintain its strategic assets in Egypt. The United States may ‘allow a controlled democratizing process . . . and hope that the elections held under this umbrella will be won mainly by the liberal, IMF-oriented elite’ – the very outcome, Aijaz Ahmad (2011) notes, that many of the protesters have hoped for. Progressive forces seeking an authentic revolution may therefore come to be co-opted and constrained in a ‘passive revolution’, to use Antonio Gramsci’s phrase (Hoare and Nowell-Smith 1971). This global situation helps form some of the backdrop to the considerations of this volume. Indeed, one of the key features of disciplinary neoliberalism since its emergence in the 1970s is how, until now, its crises of accumulation (e.g. debt and financial crises) have also provided opportunities for dominant forces to extend and deepen neoliberalism as a geopolitical project, as I noted in the early 1990s (Gill 1990; see also Panitch, Albo and Chibber 2011). In the present conjuncture, dominant forces in the global North have taken advantage of the crisis of accumulation to deepen and extend disciplinary neoliberalism – a strategy facilitated by the general absence of significant, organized forces of opposition. As has been noted, this is less obviously the case in the global South, where the global crisis of accumulation coincides with a crisis of authoritarian rule, perhaps opening up new possibilities for progressive forces to press for new forms of governance.

**4 Latin America is moving away from neoliberal structures of governance but the alt is key**

**Cahill 9** (Damien, lecturer in political economy at the University of Sydney, Australia, “The End of Neoliberalism?”, <http://www.zcommunications.org/the-end-of-neoliberalism-by-damien-cahill>, ZBurdette)

This is not to suggest that a retreat from neoliberalism is impossible. The example of the Chavez government in **Venezuela demonstrates that neoliberalism can be dismantled,** but that it takes more than deteriorating economic conditions for this to occur. **In Venezuela and other Latin American countries, neoliberalism has been wound back** as a result of a political mobilization by the working and peasant classes of society. Because the forces and structures supportive of neoliberalism remain strong globally, it is likely that a popular political mobilization would also be necessary in other countries to wind back neoliberalism, even given the current financial crisis and the obvious failures of the neoliberal model. Neoliberalism is not inevitable, but a new politics is required to impose democratic and socially protective alternatives upon both capital and the state.

### A2 perm plan then alt

#### 2. This is not a residual link – the plan is neoliberal:

Gonzalez, law prof, 3 (Carmen, Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, p. 685, 2003, “Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba”, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987944>, ZBurdette)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external—the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era.410 It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path.

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union.412 Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.415

It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cubansovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418

Cuba is once again at a crossroads—as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.419 The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation.

The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### 3. Perm just re-brands dissent into a new enclosure-creates cooption.

Neubauer 12 (Robert J, is a Phd Student at the School of Communications at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver “Dialogue, Monologue, or Something in Between? Neoliberal Think Tanks in the Americas,” http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewfile/1481/789)

As Mato (1997, 2003, 2005, 2008) notes, transnational networks are rarely entirely unified, as elites emerge from different nations with their own institutions, histories, cultures, and political priorities. It is thereby telling that one Dialogue publication from 2009 states that “our membership is politically diverse,” including both “Republicans and Democrats from the United States,” as well as supporters of various “parties and political perspectives from elsewhere in the Americas” (IAD, 2009). This diverse ideological and regional representation may account for the fact that many of the IAD’s Latin directors do not consider themselves neoliberals, with some serving in nominally social democratic governments. As President of Chile, Lagos oversaw the establishment of national unemployment insurance and expansions in public education (ICG, n.d.), while Foxley has argued that states “must develop some kind of social protection for those who are left out of the process of globalization” (Public Broadcasting Service [PBS], 2001). Given this divergence from neoliberal orthodoxy, it is plausible that the Dialogue aims to smooth out tensions and establish a rolling consensus around a reform agenda. This may be made easier in that virtually all Dialogue directors emerge from the economic and political institutions of the transnational neoliberal bloc and state apparatus. Tellingly, there neither seems to be labor representatives nor any members of the New Left among the IAD’s Latin directorate. Therefore, it should be unsurprising that even the Dialogue’s “social democrats” seem to have embraced the overall project of regional neoliberalization. For instance, Foxley has come to “appreciate the strength and the power of the market,” even grudgingly commending Pinochet’s economic program for “deregulating the markets” and “opening up the economy” (PBS, 2001). Regardless of occasional social democratic rhetoric, directors have been intimately involved with processes of neoliberal restructuring and transnational state consolidation. Many have worked in top-level posts with neoliberal IFIs: Director David de Ferranti served as a World Bank Vice-President (Results for Development Institute, n.d.); Foxley was a Governor of the World Bank and the IADB (CGD, n.d.); and Iglesias served as President of the IADB (n.d.) for 17 years. Other directors have been involved with neoliberal privatizations. As President of Brazil, Cardoso oversaw the most sweeping privatization program in the country’s history (Epstein, 1998; View from RBC, 2012). He was instrumental in the 1997 privatization of CVRD, now the world’s second largest mining corporation (and a key holding of Dialogue funder AIG). Cardoso also oversaw the 1998 break-up of Telebras, Latin America's biggest telecommunications firm. Board members have also facilitated transnational state formation through the negotiation and implementation of regional free trade agreements. As president of Chile, Lagos signed “expansive trade agreements with the United States, the European Union and South Korea” (Armington, Lettieri, & Slim, 2005); Iglesias chaired the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations that gave birth to the WTO (IADB, 2010); and Hills served as chief U.S. trade negotiator during the negotiations for NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, at one time declaring that the United States would open up foreign markets “with a crowbar, if necessary” (Uchitelle, 1990).

### A2 Embargo was neolib!

#### 1 Plan’s deregulation is the mantra of neoliberalism.

**Wasserman, Nuclear Information Resource Service senior advisor, 2001**

(Harvey, “Deregulation: The mantra of corporate globalization”, <http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Economics/Deregulation_mantra.html>, DOA: 6-23-12)

Deregulation is a disaster for the public. All deregulation really means is the removal of any semblance of public participation in any of the decisions involving energy generation and distribution. It's a completely cynical, antidemocratic, and ultimately catastrophic move to deregulate. WHY DOESN'T deregulation work? BECAUSE ELECTRIC power is a natural monopoly. You will never have meaningful competition in the electric power business. It's like proposing that there be competition between streets. The only real competition in the electric power business is between public-owned power and private-owned power. And public-owned power, without exception, has provided electricity cleaner, safer, cheaper, and more reliably throughout the last century than private-owned power. That's just the reality of the situation. And the idea of using deregulation to introduce the so-called magic of the marketplace to the electric power business is utter nonsense. You are simply exchanging a regulated monopoly for a deregulated monopoly, and there's nothing worse than a deregulated monopoly. DO YOU think that the forces of globalization are behind the drive to deregulate? MOST DEFINITELY. Deregulation is the mantra of corporate globalization. They do not want interference from the public. Basically, it's a new form of economic feudalism, where the big corporations sit on high, make their decisions in the boardrooms, and have no interference whatsoever-from the public, from the government, or from grassroots organizations. That's what globalization is all about. That's why deregulation-not only of electricity, but of the airlines, the trucking industry, telecommunications, now even water-translates into a complete feudalization of economic life on this planet.

#### Social sciences reproduce the status quo, delegitimizes critical alternatives-only serves to maintain the hegemony of neoliberalism.

**Foster et al., Oregon sociology professor, 2010**

(John, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth, pg 14-8, ldg)

If natural science is now posing such serious questions about the continuation of life as we know it, what is the role of social science? Should it not be helping us to understand how humanity, by radically changing its system of social and economic production, which today is clearly the chief cause of the problem, might respond to this massive threat? Unfortunately, the role of social science in this respect is paradoxical. Tragically, the more pressing the environmental problem has become and the more urgent the call for ecological revolution has been articulated, the more quiescent social scientists seem to have become on the topic, searching for a kind of remediation of the problem, in which real change will not be required. Although thirty years ago it was common to find challenges to the capitalist exploitation of the environment emanating from social scientists who were then on the environmentalist fringe, today the main thrust of environmental social science has shifted to ecological modernization—a managerial approach that sees sustainable technology, sustainable consumption, and market-based solutions (indeed "sustainable capitalism") as pro-viding the answers.8 Here, social scientists parallel the stance of main-stream environmental technocrats—such as Thomas Friedman, Fred Krupp of the Environmental Defense Fund, Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger from the Breakthrough Institute, as well as Newt Gingrich—who propose that a green industrial revolution, rooted in technological innovation and efficiency, will produce a green society. For this group, new "green markets" will enhance economic growth, which remains the real objective.9 Thus as natural scientists have become more concerned about the detrimental effects of the economic system on the environment, and correspondingly radicalized, asking more and more root questions, social scientists have increasingly turned to the existing economic system as the answer. Indeed, it is no longer surprising to see a major European social scientist, such as Ulrich Beck (the originator of the "risk society" concept), writing of "the global consensus on climate protection that is now within reach [and which] is also creating new markets Under a regime of 'green capitalism' composed of transnationally structured ecological enforced markets, ecology no longer represents a hindrance to the economy. Rather, the opposite holds: ecology and climate protection could soon represent a direct route to profits." For Beck, capitalism—removed from its reality as a system of capital accumulation without end—can be seen as fully compatible with sustaining the earth, in sharp opposition to decades of green analysis that argued precisely the opposite. Likewise environmental sociologist Arthur Mol points to what he calls "promising developments and prospects in the taming of transnational capitalism" offered by "the European Union and to a lesser extent NAFTA," which as supra-national power structures are said to be in a position "to counteract the environmental side effects of global capitalism."10 How do we explain this growing quiescence of social science with respect to environmental problems (explicitly including environmental social science) even as the problem itself, as natural scientists insist, is rapidly accelerating? Answering this question requires that we look at some of the persistent weaknesses that permeate social science, and how this relates to the ecological crisis specifically. Social science has been in many ways hamstrung in our society precisely because its object is the social, and hence both its analysis and what is deemed acceptable/unacceptable tends to be filtered through the dominant institutions and structures of the prevailing hierarchical social order. The stagnation that has so often characterized contemporary social science is thus in many ways a built-in function of the system's commitment to stasis in its fundamental social-property relations. Social scientists have often displayed amazing, ingenious techniques for getting around this problem and raising critical ideas despite the limitations imposed by the hegemonic culture. Important observations and discoveries are made. But more often than not, such challenges are directed at what from the standpoint of the social system as a whole are marginal issues, thereby more readily tolerated. Where social science goes beyond this and addresses the problem of power head on, most of these contributions, no matter how singular, end up being treated as isolated discoveries, which, lacking any meaningful relation to the dominant social practice, are quickly forgotten. In the mid-twentieth century, leading British scientist and Marxist social critic, J. D. Bernal, provided a useful starting point for a discussion of the weaknesses of social science in a class society, in his monumental book Science in History (1954). Considering some of the reasons commonly given for what he called the "backwardness" of the social sciences in relation to the natural sciences in the twentieth century, Bernal dismissed two of these as illusory: (1) the supposed impossibility of experimentation in the social sciences; and (2) the notion that the advance of social science is seriously inhibited by the fact that it involves value judgments. He also dismissed three other commonly offered reasons as of very limited explanatory power, in terms of explaining the failures of social science: (1) the reflexive nature of the social sciences, whereby human beings are both the subject and object of study; (2) the sheer complexity of human society, viewed as much more than a mere aggregation of the complex psychological attributes of its members; and (3) the changing nature of society, which does not allow for fixed laws. For Bernal, these factors contributed to the distinctiveness of the social sciences but did not significantly block their advance or explain their underdevelopment. Rather, the real obstacles facing the social sciences, he suggested, could be attributed almost entirely to the fact that they were seriously circumscribed by and often directly subservient to the established order of power, and specifically to the dominant social/property relations (in ways only indirectly applicable to the natural sciences). Despite important advances and revolutionary developments, social science in "normal times" has been more about maintaining/managing a given social order than encouraging the historical changes necessary to human society, where social capacities and challenges keep evolving. The imperative of those in power to maintain hegemonic control was so compelling, Bernal explained, that Plato "deliberately con-structed myths instead of rational explanations for the common people in the Republic" as a means of defending his ideal aristocratic order. Today similar ideological means, although not always so deliberate, are employed. "In short," Bernal wrote, "the backwardness and emptiness of the social sciences are due to the overriding reason that in all class societies they are inevitably corrupt."11 Social science thus often enters a relatively dormant state once a new system of power is established. A new class-social order, once it surpasses its initial revolutionary stage and consolidates itself, demands nothing so much as "the bad conscience and evil intent of apologetics"—since the main goal from then on is to maintain its position of power/hegemony.12 Circumscribed in this way by the power structure, social science in nor-mal—non-revolutionary—periods is unable to develop in a rational direction that would allow knowledge to interact in meaningful ways with social practice, particularly of a democratic kind. The "corruption" referred to here is clearly not about such petty academic crimes as plagiarism, falsification of data, and being co-opted directly by private interests—all of which are common enough—but the much more pervasive problem of the widespread capitulation to the status quo, and evasion of all alternative perspectives, even at the cost of the abandonment of rational analysis and meaningful social practice. Getting ahead in the academy (as well as in the media, the government, and other places in which social scientists are to be found) all too often involves self-censorship, a narrow focus on the relatively inconsequential, and leaving the big stuff—in terms of social change—off the table. Hence, "social science becomes an accumulation of harmless platitudes with disconnected empirical additions."13 The more powerful a set of insights offered by a given social theory, say, Marxian theory—or the more penetrating insights of particular thinkers, say, Rousseau, Hegel, Weber, Veblen, Schumpeter, and Keynes—the more likely they are to be discarded in essence, to be winnowed down or bastardized and replaced by frameworks more conducive to the mere perpetuation of the status quo. A good example of this is the rise of what Joan Robinson famously called "bastard Keynesianism," better known as the "neoclassical synthesis," in economics after the Second World War, in which all the main elements of the Keynesian revolution were discarded, since they were too threat-ening to the established order.14 It is no accident, then, that the greatest achievements in social science have occurred during periods of social disruption. Indeed, the social sciences as we know them today are largely a product of the bourgeois revolutions in Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, and are associated with the birth of capitalism. This period gave rise to both modern liberal and modern socialist conceptions. By the twentieth century, however, social science was increasingly consolidated arid entrenched as part of a relatively stable period of global capitalist hegemony. Although there were revolutionary challenges to the system, emanating primarily from the periphery rather than the core of the world system, the hegemonic social science within the system's center remained largely untouched—despite its growing disconnection from world trends. Mainstream social science was therefore marked by a number of contradictory tendencies: (1) its increasingly static, ahistorical character; (2) its reductionism and abstract empiricism (mimicking in crude versions of positivism the worst tendencies of natural science); (3) its increasing relativism, culturalism, and irrationalism (in the form of a complementary anti-historical tradition emanating from the humanities); and (4) its anti-naturalism (in the sense of the divorce from the wider context of existence, the natural prerequisites of life).15 More and more the human sciences have taken on the dominant attitudes and incapacities of "liberal practicality," involving scattered attention to "innumerable factors" of individual milieus. The result is an inability to conceive of adequate causes, which are invariably structural, operating "behind the backs" of individuals. In its most extreme forms, such a distorted approach to social science leads to an abandonment of any pretense to realism altogether, and hence an emphasis not so much on innumerable factors as on innumerable discourses and cultural constructions.16 The result is the kind of confused "pure empiricism," in which, as Hegel wrote, "everything has equal rights with everything else; one characteristic is as real as another, and none has precedence."17 Although these various proclivities of contemporary social science are seemingly diverse and often appear diametrically opposed to one another, they share incapacity to connect a critical historical perspective on human society with the forms of social practice necessary to carry out meaningful social change. The result is an effectual capitulation to the status quo. The space of real action envisioned within mainstream social science (insofar as such action remains an object) is relegated to a kind of "pragmatic" managerialism appropriate to a bureaucratic ethos — a philosophy of simply "making do" with all the main parameters of society predetermined.

#### 2 They make all life disposable

Giroux 8 [Henry, PROF. OF CULTURAL STUDIES AND COMMUNICATION AT MCMASTER UNIVERSITY, “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age” Social Identities, September, 2008, CMR]

Needless to say, invoking hope must be connected to a version of biopolitics in which life meaningful, purposeful and dignified life, not simply bare life is both affirmed and made central to the challenge of addressing the problem of disposability as global in its roots and transformation. This suggests a political pedagogy in which injustices on a local level are linked to broader global forces, and a notion of public responsibility in which matters of human waste and disposability are ‘condemned not because a law is broken, but because people have been hurt’ (Simon, 2005, p. 117). In a market-driven society in which disposability is now central to modes of regulation, growth, and power, the price that is being paid in human costs is so high as to potentially spell the eventual destruction of the planet itself. At the same time, the return of Gilded Age excess with its biopolitics of wealth, greed, and gross inequality reveals its link to a historical past in which the rich squander valuable resources and remove themselves from the violence, loss, pain and death visited daily on billions of people on the planet. The return of the Gilded Age must be viewed not as historical reinvention, but as a referent for critique and collective struggles for democracy. Just as suffering can no longer be treated as either routine or commonsensical, the New Gilded Age and its institutional formations, values, corruptions, and greed must be rewritten in the discourse of moral outrage, economic justice, and organized resistance. Against the apocalyptic ‘dream-worlds’ of neoliberalism, educators and others need to find new ways to rebuild those deserted public spheres from the schools to the media to cyberspace where it becomes possible to produce the conditions in which individual empowerment is connected not only to the acquisition of knowledge and skills, but also to social power (Bauman, 2005, p. 124). In an age marked by outsourcing, uncertainty, deregulation, privatization, and downsizing, hope is in short supply because many people have little sense of a different future, or of what it means to seek justice collectively rather than individually, relying on their own meagre resources to combat problems that far exceed individual solutions. As shared fears, insecurities, and uncertainties replace shared responsibilities, those who bear the effects of negative globalization and neoliberalism increasingly retreat into the narrowly circumscribed worlds of either consumerism or the daily routines of struggling to survive. Ignorance, indifference, and apathy provide the conditions for political inaction and the atrophy of democratic politics.

### A2 perm 2xb

### A2 Need to work within markets

#### Alt doesn’t eliminate capitalism-but rather creates social forms in spite of capitalism.

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2004**

(Massimo, “Separating the Doing and the Deed: Capital and the Continuous Character of Enclosures”, Historical Materialism; 2004, Vol. 12 Issue 2, p57-87, ebsco, ldg)

However, we must be fully aware of the implications of this discourse on commons. As we have seen, since commons emerge out of a relational social ﬁeld, they are deﬁned in opposition to enclosures. In other words, just as capital’s drive for accumulation must identify a common as limit for its expansion and thus outline strategies of new enclosures, 67 so the building of alternatives to capital must identify a strategic space in which current enclosures are limiting the development of new commons. To be able to identify, so to speak, ‘them’ as the limit of ‘our’ project would be a great strength, a strength that is based on processes of political recomposition and constitution of projects that pose the concrete question of alternatives here and now, and not in a distant future. In other words, life despite capitalism and not life after capitalism. How can we politically invert capital’s strategies and identify enclosures as limits for non-market social interactions and as a strategic space for new commons? This is the true strategic challenge faced by the many articulations of today’s global justice and solidarity movement. As I have argued elsewhere, to be viable and desirable, a process for the deﬁnition and constitution of alternatives requires nothing less than participatory, inclusive and democratic forms of organisation that found their political practice on formulating and addressing questions such as ‘What do we want?’, ‘How do we go about getting it?’ and ‘Who is “we”?’. 68 Raising and addressing these naïve questions as part of our political practice implies that we participate in the production of a discursive inversion of the ‘ordinary run of things’, and the opening up of the many spaces for alternatives and the problematisation of their articulation.

#### Neoliberalism is different from capitalism

**Klein, London School of Economics Milibrand Fellow, 2007**

(Naomi, “The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism,” pgs. 24-5, ldg)

I am not arguing that all forms of market systems are inherently violent. It is eminently possible to have a market-based economy that requires no such brutality and demands no such ideological purity. A free market in consumer products can coexist with free public health care, with public schools, with a large segment of the economy—like a national oil company—held in state hands. It's equally possible to require corporations to pay decent wages, to respect the right of work¬ers to form unions, and for governments to tax and redistribute wealth so that the sharp inequalities that mark the corporatist state are re¬duced. Markets need not be fundamentalist. Keynes proposed exactly that kind of mixed, regulated economy af¬ter the Great Depression, a revolution in public policy that created the New Deal and transformations like it around the world. It was exactly that system of compromises, checks and balances that Friedman's counterrevolution was launched to methodically dismantle in country after country. Seen in that light, the Chicago School strain of capital¬ism does indeed have something in common with other dangerous ideologies: the signature desire for unattainable purity, for a clean slate on which to build a reengineered model society. This desire for godlike powers of total creation is precisely why free-market ideologues are so drawn to crises and disasters. Nonapoc-alyptic reality is simply not hospitable to their ambitions. For thirty-five years, what has animated Friedman's counterrevolution is an attraction to a kind of freedom and possibility available only in times of cataclysmic change—when people, with their stubborn habits and insistent demands, are blasted out of the way—moments when democracy seems a practical impossibility.

#### Internalized neoliberal policies defeat political agency and any ability to create change – this should come first

Hay, Professor of [Political Analysis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_Science) at the [University of Sheffield](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Sheffield)04 (Colin, “The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the institutional embedding of neoliberalism”, Economy and Society 33:4, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS

Second, in internalizing neoliberal economic assumptions, governing political parties in the Anglophone democracies have increasingly translated the political power conferred upon them at the ballet box into a self-denying ordinance. In Britain, as elsewhere, political parties vying for office now couch their political rhetoric to a considerable extent in terms of: (1) the nonnegotiable character of external (principally economic) imperatives; (2) the powerlessness of domestic political actors in the face of such (ostensibly selfevident) constraints; and (3) the need, in such a context, to displace responsibility to quasi-independent and supra-democratic authorities such an independent central banks.1 Elections, it seems, are increasingly about appointing officers to be trusted to take the necessary technical decisions dictated by shifting external circumstances; they are not public plebiscites on manifesto policy commitments. As Peter Burnham (2001) has observed, politics today is about the management of depoliticization. The decision by the Blair administration, only days after its election in 1997, to grant operational independence to the Bank of England despite the absence of any supporting manifesto commitment is a case in point. It is in this context that a third factor, the marketization of political competition, acquires particular significance. It, too, has arguably contributed to declining political engagement, participation and turnout (Levi 1996: 49). If the competition between parties for votes is assumed analogous to that between businesses for market-share, then parties will behave in a quasi-Downsian manner. In a first-past-the-post two party electoral system, such as Britain’s, they will tend to scrabble over the centre ground in a race towards the median voter (for a detailed elaboration of this logic, see Hay 1999a: 76\_/104; also Downs 1957). The result, ceteris paribus, is bipartisan convergence.

### A2 sq improving

#### The status quo only appears to be structurally improving because elites are gaining so much while the masses starve---aggregate measurements overlook structural inequality that makes the system unsustainable

Stephen Gill 12, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science, York University, Toronto, and a former Distinguished Scholar in International Political Economy of the International Studies Association, 2012, Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, p. 6-8

Nonetheless, some might query whether there really is, actually or potentially, a ‘global’ organic crisis, since many parts of the world, such as India and China, have continued to grow and develop; indeed, Craig Murphy has noted that many parts of the global South have had a ‘good crisis’, insofar as many of the reforms that they implemented in response to the Asian financial and economic crisis of 1997–8 have made their financial structures and patterns of economic development more internally robust and better insulated from external financial shocks originating in New York, London or Tokyo (Murphy 2010). Murphy’s point is well made. It is of course important to emphasize the geographical and social unevenness of both the experience and impacts of financial and economic crises across the global social and geopolitical hierarchy.

However, this is only part of the story. It is also important to reflect critically on the nature and quality of existing development patterns, particularly those that serve to generalize the dominant model of market civilization – a development model that is wasteful, energy-intensive, consumerist, ecologically myopic and premised on catering mainly to the affluent. Moreover, the development of China and India is far from the happy story some seem to paint – a point that the Chinese leadership seems to have recently acknowledged by prioritizing redistribution and social welfare in its next five-year plan, not least to deal with growing social and ecological contradictions and widespread political unrest. For example, every day in China there are enormous numbers of localized protests concerning living conditions and corruption. Illustrating the displacement of livelihoods and the crisis of social reproduction that characterizes the present phase of primitive accumulation in China, the government estimates that 58 million ‘left-behind children’ (almost 20 per cent of all children in China and about a half of the children living in the countryside) now live with their grandparents or in foster centres, because their parents have left to earn income in the factories and cities (Hille 2011):

Mao sent millions of parents into labour camps and their children to the countryside; he forced families to abandon the stoves in their homes and to use communal kitchens and dorms. Even so, Mao failed, ultimately, to destroy the family as the basic cell of Chinese society. Today, what the dictator was unable to accomplish with force is being realized instead by the lure of money.

Meanwhile, in India, we see mass suicides of farmers as a debt crisis envelops their lives; elsewhere in the country perhaps as many as 800 million poor people have been hardly touched by the changes. Most live in the shadow of ‘shining India’. The global situation is therefore replete with deep contradictions. On the one hand, few would deny that material conditions are improving for many Chinese and Indians, and that this should continue to be the case. On the other hand, if the market civilization model of capitalist development not only continues in the wealthier countries but also becomes more generalized in India, China and other large developing countries such as Brazil (notwithstanding President Lula’s redistributive policies), and also assuming that the US rulers sustain their policies and military capabilities along similar lines to now in order to defend and extend that model, I hypothesize that the global organic crisis will intensify. Its effects will be felt in ways that will be uneven geographically, unequal politically and socially and materially hierarchical. Put differently, the organic crisis may also be globalizing across regions and societies at varying speeds, and it will probably be differentiated in its effects on life chances and basic conditions of existence, generating diverse political effects within and across jurisdictions and throughout the social and political spectrum. Politically, and perhaps paradoxically, at this moment the global organic crisis has not been manifested as a crisis of legitimacy in the global North (although less so in many parts of the global South).However, the question is: will this situation persist – and, indeed, can the current neoliberal frameworks of global leadership retain legitimacy and credibility while developing a constructive and meaningful set of policies to address it? If not, what are the prospects for alternative concepts of global leadership and frameworks of rule?